Federico Bordonaro

Max Hastings in today’s Financial Times says that, in spite of Vaclav Klaus’ recent signature of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU may confront a much more difficult crisis if — like it’s expected — David Cameron will win British general elections later this year.

Gordon Brown on Monday contrasted his party’s commitment to Europe with Tory Euroscepticism, and it is hard to say he was unjust. Opposition leader David Cameron displayed considerable courage in his response to the EU Lisbon Treaty ratification, rejecting a referendum if he takes office next year. Reaction from the Tory right was muted. Its standard-bearers recognise the priority of an election victory, which would be imperilled by disunity.

Thereafter, however, Europe will become a serious issue for a future Cameron government. There will be relentless pressure from the Tory grassroots to loosen, if not break, bonds linking Britain to the EU.

The new Tory MPs will create the most Eurosceptic parliament since Britain’s 1972 entry into the Common Market. Public sentiment is at best tepid, and among a minority, pathologically hostile, in a way that transcends party and class boundaries.

Many look upon Europe as an obstacle to their security and prosperity. Arguments that, for all its flaws, the Union should be perceived as a historic success story make little impact. It is blamed for all manner of domestic social and economic difficulties, and perceived as a drain on British pockets. President Charles de Gaulle of France insisted the British are irredeemably anti-continental, and there are grounds for thinking he was right. […]
It is unlikely Britain will leave the EU, but highly plausible that Mr Cameron will sooner or later feel obliged to force a crisis on specific issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction, of which the outcome is anybody’s guess.

Interesting commentary written by Reuters’ analyst Paul Taylor:

Turkey’s bid to join the European Union is fading away with surprisingly little drama because investors no longer see the prospect of accession as an essential policy anchor.
But EU leaders should keep Ankara’s entry negotiations alive on the back burner rather than trying to engage Ankara on alternatives to membership, as French President Nicolas Sarkozy would like to do.
In a version of the old Soviet workers’ joke, “they pretend to pay us and we pretend to work,” the buzz on Turkey in the European Commission’s enlargement department is, “they pretend they’re reforming and we pretend we want them”.

Since too many years, EU rotating presidencies simply pass the buck on the next one when it comes to Turkey’s accession bid. However, in the last couple of years the issue has been discussed less heatly than it was before.
While Europe may choose to “indirectly” exhaust Turkey’s patience on the bid issue, it also fears that Ankara might turn less Western-oriented, as this analysis explains:

For decades, Turkey was a junior player in the West’s Cold War alliance, run by military generals; now it has its own voice and enough clout to spar at times with its NATO partners.
Despite harsh rhetoric, Turkish pragmatism has kept military business with Israel largely intact. Israel is involved in two major military projects — tank and fighter plane upgrades — worth more than US$1 billion in Turkey. The Turkish military has also bought Israeli drones to help fight Kurdish rebels, whose strength has waned since their heyday in the 1990s.
“Relations between Israel and Turkey are strategic and decades-old,” said Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak. “Despite the ups and downs, Turkey continues to be a key player in our region. We shouldn’t be drawn into frenzied statements about it.”
Alon Liel, who was Israel’s No. 1 diplomat in Turkey in the 1980s, described the situation as a “crisis” and said Israel had received “very harsh signals” from an increasingly assertive government.
“Today there is a new foreign policy that doesn’t rely only on the West. They see themselves as a player in many regional circles,” he said. “All this assertiveness in the region gives Turkey a self-confidence that allows it to be tougher to us.”

Interview for RFERL quoted by Brian Whitmore in his article on the Azeri-Turkish gas row:

Azerbaijan has apparently decided to play its energy card.

As much of the world applauded Turkey’s historic rapprochement with Armenia last week, Azerbaijan felt left out in the cold and abandoned by its closest ally.

Baku had argued strenuously that a deal to reestablish relations between Ankara and Yerevan should not be signed while Armenia continued to occupy Nagorno-Karabakh, and it threatened to take unspecified countermeasures if one was.

Speaking at a nationally televised cabinet meeting on October 16, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev revealed one of those steps: “It is not a secret to anyone that for many years Azerbaijan has been selling its gas to Turkey for one-third of market prices.”

Aliyev added: “What state would agree to sell its natural resources for 30 percent of world market prices, especially under current conditions? This is illogical.”

Moldova Urges Russian Troops to Quit Rebel Region

Moldova’s new Western-leaning leadership, in an early challenge to Moscow, said on Thursday it would press Russia to withdraw its soldiers from the country’s breakaway Transdniestria region.

Russia has a peacekeeping force of around 1,200 soldiers stationed since 1992 in the rebel territory, a mainly Russian-speaking sliver of land bordering Ukraine.

The context is fluid. Transnistria, together with Crimea, is one of the potential flashpoints in Eastern Europe. Let’s see how this develops and what ramifications it may cause for the WBSR.

Why the hurry?. Interview for RFERL on the Caspian summit without Iran.
Update on the summit:

Berdymukhammedov’s statement cited the “bright future” of pipeline projects to export Turkmen gas. A pipeline to China is due to start operating at the end of this year. It should eventually pump some 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually. The Turkmen president also mentioned a proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline project that would export slightly less gas (some 27-33 bcm annually).

Berdymukhammedov added that Turkmenistan, with the fourth-largest gas reserves in the world, has sufficient reserves to supply the European Union-backed Nabucco pipeline project (31 bcm annually).

But Berdymukhammedov avoided mention of gas supplies to Russia or of plans to repair a gas pipeline linking the two countries that was damaged by an explosion in April.

The Turkmen government has blamed Russia for the explosion, which happened as Russia’s Gazprom was pressing Turkmenistan to lower the price for its gas supplies. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was due to travel after the talks to Turkmenistan, where he would have more opportunity to address bilateral issues.

The Pri-Caspian pipeline project — planned to bring Turkmen, Kazakh, and Uzbek gas to Russia via a pipeline along the northeastern Caspian coast — was also notable for its absence from Berdymukhammedov’s statement. All four countries agreed to that project in 2007, but there has been little movement of late aside from Kazakhstan’s pledge on September 11 that it would start laying sections of that pipeline in 2010.

The Turkmen statement was released to mark the “Day of Oil, Gas, Electrical Workers and Geologists” in that country.

But the fact that it coincided with the Caspian talks suggests it was an effort to give the Turkmen president extra leverage in talks with his three counterparts at the summit.

Of the three projects mentioned by Berdymukhammedov’s office, only the Western-backed Nabucco project would involve any of the other three countries represented in Kazakhstan (Azerbaijan via a yet-to-be-built trans-Caspian pipeline).

Excluding Iran

The leaders had said in their opening statements that no major decisions on use of the Caspian would be made in the absence of the only littoral state not in attendance, Iran.

Tehran was not invited to the talks and complained bitterly this week about its exclusion.

Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, suggested there are many topics that the four leaders from Caspian states also allied within the CIS can discuss more effectively without non-member Iran.

In today’s Financial Times, Charles Grant, director of the Centre for European Reform and the author of “Is Europe doomed to fail as a power?”, offers a concise yet brilliant analysis of the state-of-the-art of European defence policy.
Grant points out that, despite visible progress, the EU defence capabilities still lag behind what’s needed. Moreover, he underlines how the geopolitical realities of EU Neighbourhood are marked by an ‘arc of instability’ (Balkans-Caucasus region-Middle East) that EU powers should take seriously.

How to make Europe’s military work
By Charles Grant

The European Union is justly proud of its “soft power” – its prosperity, stability and commitment to multilateral institutions have won admirers the world over. A decade ago, when the EU launched the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and appointed Javier Solana as the first high representative for foreign policy, it signalled ambitions in the field of hard power, too. Policymakers in places such as Beijing, Delhi and Moscow took note.

These days, however, few governments elsewhere view the EU as a rising power. They regard it as slow-moving, badly organised and often divided. They are particularly scornful of its lack of military muscle. To be sure, some of the two dozen European missions have made a difference, such as the peacekeepers sent to Bosnia, Chad and eastern Congo, the judges helping to run Kosovo, and the flotilla combating pirates off the coast of Somalia. But one purpose of the ESDP was to generate significant new military capabilities, and in that it has failed. The mission to Chad was delayed by a lack of helicopters – until the Russians provided some.

Defence budgets have been slashed across Europe and only five member states spend more than 2 per cent of gross domestic product on defence (Britain, France, Poland, Greece and Bulgaria, but the latter two contribute very little to EU missions). In theory the EU can call on two “battlegroups” – rapid reaction forces available for deployment to a crisis zone – at any moment. But many battlegroups exist only on paper and none has ever been deployed.

This military weakness matters. An arc of instability, stretching from eastern Europe via the western Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East to north Africa, borders the EU. A security crisis in the EU’s neighbourhood may affect its interests directly, for example, by unleashing waves of refugees. There will surely be many occasions when the EU is called on to deploy soldiers, policemen or humanitarian aid. The US expects the EU to be able to sort out its own backyard, notably in the Balkans. And the United Nations wants the Europeans to be ready to intervene in African war zones.
(more…)

Banca d’Italia’s governor, Mr Mario Draghi, stated this week that criminal groups may be favoured by the ongoing economic crisis, as businesses will have more troubles in getting money from the banks and may thus fall into the usury trap.

Equilibri.net’s analyst Anna Longhini predicted such an outcome in a February 2009 article.

La crisi economica sta iniziando a colpire duramente dal punto di vista dell’accesso al credito le piccole e medie imprese italiane, a causa di un mercato creditizio che presta a tassi elevati e a condizioni che favoriscono una sempre minore flessibilità nell’esercizio dell’attività imprenditoriale. Parallelamente il mercato dell’usura sta trovando un terreno sempre più fertile in cui operare, perché chi non ottiene i finanziamenti necessari dalle banche o dalle finanziarie spesso si vede costretto a rivolgersi al mercato dell’usura. Il quadro descritto emerge dai dati dell’ultimo rapporto Sos Impresa di Confesercenti del 2008, che mette in luce i numeri di quello che è soltanto uno dei rami dell’attività mafiosa nel nostro Paese.

Analysis by Bruce Pannier for RFERLwith bits of an interview of mine.

Intervista per Radio Radicale sul vertice di Praga e la questione del “Corridoio Sud”.

LABORATORIO DI CARTOGRAFIA PER L’ANALISI GEOPOLITICA

Docente: Nieves López Izquierdo

Cartografa di Le Monde diplomatique

L’analisi geopolitica ha come suo principale strumento l’utilizzo di mappe cartografiche, carte tematiche, fisiche e politiche. La collocazione nello spazio geografico di fenomeni di carattere economico, politico, sociale o informazioni dettagliate ed utili alla comprensione del complesso scenario geopolitico costituisce un elaborato stumento di analisi che unisce al contempo elevata capacità di raccolta dei dati, analisi e strumenti di rappresentazioni utili alla comprensione dei fenomeni.

Il corso/laboratorio che Equilibri propone consiste nel fornire gli strumenti pratici affinché chi voglia operare nel campo dell’analisi geopolitica possa usufruire di strumenti cartografici avanzati e la possibilità di realizzarli secondo i propri scopi di analisi. Il laboratorio di cartografia completa un percorso di analisi già perseguito attraverso i corsi ARI aggiungendo un ulteriore tassello metodologico e pratico ad un complesso percorso di formazione.

SEDI e DATE

Milano:

venerdi 12 giugno (10.00 - 18.30) 2009
sabato 13 giugno (10.00 - 17.30) 2009

Via Vigevano, 39 (Zona Navigli - P.ta Genova)

Le iscrizioni al Corso - Laboratorio di cartografia per l’analisi geopolitica si chiuderanno mercoledi 10 giugno 2009.

Maggiori informazioni (programma del corso, moduli per l’iscrizione).

L’Outlook 2009, frutto del lavoro dei vari desk di ricerca e analisi del Centro Studi di Equilibri, cerca di individuare, in ciascuna area geografica, i principali fattori di criticità dell’anno appena iniziato. L’obiettivo è quello di fornire alcune semplici chiavi di lettura per interpretare la complessità dell’attuale contesto internazionale a livello politico-diiplomatico, economico e della sicurezza attraverso la lente di ingrandimento dell’analisi geopolitica. Diviso per aree geografiche (Africa, Americhe, Asia e Pacifico, Europa e Medio Oriente), l’Outlook 2009 contiene: un’introduzione, in cui vengono delineati i principali fattori e le dinamiche dell’area in questione; un outlook generale; un focus d’area, contenente un approfondimento su un particolare contesto ritenuto rilevante nel contesto regionale; un’intervista ad un esperto.

Scarica il file PDF.

Intervista per il Desk Europa di Equilibri.net.

Analisi di Vukasin Ostojic per il Desk Europa di Equilibri.net

L’obiettivo di accesso all’Unione Europea è stata la priorità verso la quale la Croazia ha rivolto dagli anni 2000 un complesso piano di riforme volto a cambiare radicalmente il paese. Sono invece venticinque chilometri di frontiera marittima contesa con la confinante Slovenia a portare Lubiana al veto sui negoziati tra UE e Zagabria. Il 2009 sarà un anno cruciale per sbloccare e portare a compimento i negoziati di adesione all’Unione, ma anche per fronteggiare la crisi economica globale. Le prospettive di crescita sono state drasticamente tagliate e la Croazia, come il resto dei paesi europei, si prepara a un anno difficilissimo.

Nonostante l’impegno dell’UE e la moderazione del governo serbo, l’inizio dell’anno è stato segnato da una ripresa delle tensioni in Kosovo. La città di Mitrovica, uno dei contesti più complicati del nascente stato kosovaro, è stata teatro di esplosioni e proteste violente il 2 gennaio.

Il reportage Reuters informa che

Sei persone sono rimaste ferite in una delle esplosioni. Dei serbi hanno dato fuoco a due negozi albanesi, e mentre i vigili del fuoco accorrevano per spegnere le fiamme è esploso un secondo ordigno.

“Tre vigili del fuoco e altre tre persone sono state ricoverate in ospedale. Le loro condizioni sono stabili”, ha detto Marko Jaksic, direttore serbo dell’ospedale di Mitrovica.

La polizia non ha fornito dettagli sulle cause delle esplosioni, la seconda delle quali è avvenuta a Bosnjacka Mahala, una comunità isolata a maggioranza albanese che si trova nella parte serba della città.

Le forze della Nato e la polizia dell’Unione europea (Eulex) hanno rafforzato la loro presenza e dei blindati sorvegliano la zona.

“Ora, la Nato e l’Eulex hanno portato la situazione sotto controllo”, ha detto Besim Hoti, portavoce della polizia del Kosovo a Mitrovica.

Le tensioni etniche a Mitrovica restano alte dopo che un adolescente serbo è stato ferito da due ragazzi albanesi armati di coltello il 30 dicembre, un episodio che ha scatenato l’ira di centinaia di serbi che hanno bruciato diversi negozi albanesi e danneggiato auto con targhe del Kosovo. I due aggressori albanesi sono stati arrestati.

Mitrovica è una città instabile divisa tra la maggioranza albanese e la minoranza serba da quando il Kosovo ha dichiarato l’indipendenza dalla Serbia nel febbraio scorso. Circa 20.000 serbi vivono nella parte nord della città ma rifiutano di avere a che fare con le istituzioni del Kosovo e considerano Belgrado la loro capitale

In un’analisi del 27 ottobre 2008 per il Desk Europa di Equilibri.net si metteva in luce, a proposito delle prospettive a breve termine per la stabilizzazione definitiva, come

La proposta di spartizione del territorio kosovaro non sembra raccogliere i consensi necessari per la sua realizzazione ed a ben vedere presenta molti punti critici, come la difficoltà di stabilire una frontiera netta tra gli insediamenti serbi e quelli albanesi; tuttavia è chiaro che la Serbia non accetterà facilmente una soluzione della questione che la veda perdente su tutta la linea; la stessa integrazione nell’Unione Europea non sembra rappresentare una contropartita sufficiente ed in ogni caso viene portata avanti da Bruxelles in maniera indecisa, a causa della rigidità di alcuni stati membri, mettendo a rischio lo stesso sentimento europeista diffusosi in Serbia negli ultimi anni.Le divisioni degli stati europei sulla indipendenza del Kosovo corrispondono alla diversità degli interessi dei vari paesi, alcuni dei quali sono chiamati a fronteggiare sfide analoghe alla secessione di Pristina (evidente il caso di Cipro) ed in ogni caso temono il potenziale destabilizzante delle indipendenze etniche. Per l’Europa la regione dei Balcani è un banco di prova della sua capacità di portare avanti in maniera unitaria una politica estera coerente; se l’obiettivo dichiarato di un Kosovo multietnico è compromesso da tempo, la stessa missione Eulex rischia di essere, qualora non venissero offerte delle concessioni agli interessi serbi, l’ennesima dimostrazione della sua incapacità di condurre una politica estera e di difesa adeguata alle sue ambizioni.

Video-interviste agli analisti di Equilibri.net.

LE VIDEO INTERVISTE

La Pirateria

Intervista ad Aldo Pigoli - Vice Direttore editoriale di Equilibri.net - Responsabile Desk Africa e Americhe
20/12/2008

A cura di Jacopo Marazia - jacopomarazia[at]yahoo.it

Israele Vs Iran Parte II

Intervista a Giacomo Goldkorn - Direttore editoriale di Equilibri.net - Responsabile Desk Medio Oriente
20/12/2008

A cura di Jacopo Marazia - jacopomarazia[at]yahoo.it

Israele Vs Iran Parte I

Intervista a Giacomo Goldkorn - Direttore editoriale di Equilibri.net - Responsabile Desk Medio Oriente
20/12/2008

A cura di Jacopo Marazia - jacopomarazia[at]yahoo.it

La Finanza Islamica

Intervista a Giacomo Goldkorn - Direttore editoriale di Equilibri.net - Responsabile Desk Medio Oriente
20/12/2008

A cura di Jacopo Marazia - jacopomarazia[at]yahoo.it