Federico Bordonaro

In light of this week’s decision by the Obama Administration to scrap U.S. plans for an anti-missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, and of NATO Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s proposal of a possible joint U.S.-Russian-NATO missile shield, I re-post an analysis that I wrote for PINR with Dr. Giuseppe Anzera back in July 2006 on the ballistic missiles issue.

25 July 2006
‘‘Ballistic Missiles: A Crucial Strategic Issue for the United States and Europe'’

hile the mainstream media has covered the question of nuclear proliferation in recent years, ballistic missile proliferation is emerging as an increasingly crucial, yet less publicized, strategic issue. On July 4, for example, North Korea tested a Taepodong-2 missile. Five days later, India fired an Agni class missile. Both tests failed, but they signaled how enhanced missile technology will soon be available for these two states. While India is a solid democracy and is even courted by Washington as a new strategic partner, the same is not true for North Korea.

There are two fundamental aspects in the evolution process of today’s ballistic missiles. The first one is the effort made by so-called rogue states, such as North Korea and Iran, to upgrade their offensive capabilities quickly as a result of more powerful and longer range ballistic missiles. The second one is the different perceptions existing in the United States and the European Union about both offensive and defensive missile technologies. Such divergence, caused by historical and geostrategic issues, may hinder the birth of an integrated, transatlantic, missile defense system.

Historical Background

Ballistic missiles have been at the core of global security matters before, such as during the Cold War. In the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union gradually reached the conclusion that increasingly sophisticated anti-ballistic missile defense systems were responsible for bringing more instability to the global military balance since better defenses stimulated an offensive arms race to counter those defenses. Therefore, in 1972, Washington and Moscow signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (A.B.M.) treaty, widely considered as one of the pillars of global security agreements.

The A.B.M. treaty had been signed in a broader historical context when the two world powers were already engaged in a series of talks called the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (S.A.L.T.) aimed at limiting the number of strategic ballistic missiles possessed by the superpowers. According to such agreements, new Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (I.C.B.M.), as well as Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (S.L.B.M.), could only be added to existing arsenals after older ones were eliminated.

The period between 1969 and 1972 set the stage for a new military balance that lasted until the end of the Cold War, notwithstanding a serious crisis in Soviet-American politico-strategic relations in the early 1980s as a result of the Reagan-sponsored Strategic Defense Initiative (S.D.I.), launched on March 26, 1983, when Reagan declared the S.D.I. to be consistent with the A.B.M. treaty. However, already in the 1990s, the altered geostrategic context as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union caused many U.S. strategists to rethink the missile defense issue.

Washington then changed its perspective on global security, with regional contexts such as the Middle East and Northeast Asia becoming more important. The United States denounced the A.B.M. treaty on December 13, 2001, and withdrew from it six months later, mainly because it felt that new missile defense systems were necessary in light of the increased offensive potential of North Korea and Iran.

Nevertheless, as the George W. Bush administration announced its retreat from the A.B.M. treaty, analysts and decision-makers had divergent views about the decision. Some believed the withdrawal was necessary in order to cope with the aggressive ambitions of so-called rogue states, while others predicted that the move would trigger a global offensive arms race and increased instability.

Interestingly, China and Russia raised fewer objections to the U.S. withdrawal from the treaty than many had predicted. This was partly a result from Washington engaging the two powers in talks aimed at reassuring Beijing and Moscow that the move was not directed at them, but rather against powers like Iran, Iraq (then ruled by Saddam Hussein) and North Korea.

At present, the end of the Cold War framework is inducing some important changes. The two fundamental ones are the renewed efforts by states like Iran and North Korea, considered by Washington as threats to U.S. interests, to enhance their offensive capabilities, and the E.U.-U.S. difficult strategic debate over the issue.

Proliferation

Ballistic missile proliferation has gained center stage in the U.S. strategic debate, especially because of North Korea’s missile programs. Pyongyang is emerging not only as a proliferating power, but also as a missile technology exporter that could help Iran (and other Middle Eastern states) improve their offensive capabilities significantly.

Globally, only five states possess I.C.B.M.s, which are ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 5,500 kilometers (3,420 miles). These five states all have a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council (U.S., Russia, China, U.K., and France). Six other states have ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 1,000 kilometers (620 miles): Israel, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, and Iran.

Ballistic missiles developed by North Korea (Nodong), Pakistan (Ghauri), and Iran (Shahab) normally derive from variants of the Soviet Scud and use liquid propellant. Unlike solid propellant, liquid propellant sacrifices speed; moreover, re-fueling increases the risk of air attacks against the offensive infrastructure during operations.

Yet developments are changing, and in ways that worry the United States and its allies. First of all, Pyongyang has already developed a three-stage ballistic missile, the Taepodong (range: 2,500 kilometers, 1,550 miles), in the late 1990s. Second, Pakistan, Iran and Syria now have the technology and infrastructure necessary to produce solid propellant ballistic missiles. Pakistan purchased Chinese solid propellant missiles such as the M-11 and derived the Shaheen class missiles from them.

Third, what worries most U.S. analysts is Pyongyang’s development of the Taepodong-2 missile. This ballistic missile is said to have two variables: one is two-stage and may have a 4,000 kilometer range (2,500 miles), while another one is a three-stage missile with a range greater than 4,500 kilometers (2,800 miles); future versions, however, may have a much greater range. Briefly said, the problem is that such a weapon could reach the United States and that it could be sold to Middle Eastern powers like Iran, which may then have the capability to strike Central Europe.

As the recent missile test showed, North Korea’s technology is still flawed, and the launch failed to place Pyongyang among the satellite-launching countries or among those powers which possess I.C.B.M.s. However, tests will likely continue, and the North Korean regime will be able to draw useful lessons from the recent failures. Therefore, Western powers’ worries about Pyongyang’s plans appear to be justified, especially since export controls on missile technologies are flawed.

U.S. Projects: New Offensive Capabilities

Recent U.S. projects show that Washington is aiming at acquiring a global strike capability in order to quickly liquidate terror cells throughout the world. At the planning level, three distinct guidelines have emerged, with different technological orientations and implementation issues. The first possibility consists of orbital non-nuclear weapons, similar to what is normally called “Rods from God.” Such a choice would be the most technologically advanced, but at the same time its deployment seems far in the future. [See: “The Pentagon’s Bid to Militarize Space”]

The second possibility would be a new generation of bombers, capable of reaching every spot in the globe within one hour. The third possibility involves the re-adaptation of older weapons, such as the S.L.B.M.s, by substituting the present nuclear warheads with various types of conventional warheads. Such a choice allows for rapid implementation, although it is technologically less appealing. Ohio-class submarines carry such missile technology, and S.L.B.M.s are theoretically capable of reaching their target anywhere in the world in about 30 minutes. The project of redeploying S.L.B.M.s with conventional warheads was illustrated in the U.S. Senate in March 2006. The Pentagon decided to equip Ohio submarines with two Trident D-5 conventional missiles, allowing the United States to strike targets in Eurasia and Africa, practically without warning.

While conventional tipped S.L.B.M.s may cause less strategic, political, and ethic questions than space weaponization or nuclear warheads, they are, however, a controversial choice that has already caused sharp criticism against Washington. To begin with, the very launch of such three-stage missiles may cause dramatic, collateral damage if the first or second stage section of the rocket crashes into inhabited areas. Should the United States fire a ballistic missile during an anti-terrorism operation and cause collateral damage, the political consequences would be difficult to manage, and the human costs hardly acceptable.

Moreover, although the trajectory of the Trident D-5 may allow the United States to preordain the spots where the first two stages would fall, possible collateral damage could be caused by the third and final stage, as the latter detaches itself in the proximity of its final destination.

A second problem, the possibility of human error that would cause the United States to launch a nuclear warhead instead of a conventional one, seems less likely since the U.S. military is familiar with managing multiple warhead missile platforms as a result of experiences garnered during the Cold War.

A third question, however, appears to be trickier, and it has already been evoked by senior Russian officials in recent months. At present, Russia is the sole country to have sophisticated early warning systems able to identify in very short time the launch of a ballistic missile. Possibly, China will have such a system available in the coming years. For the political leaderships in Russia and, in the future, China, there is very little time to make a decision, after the early warning system has identified a launch, on whether it marked a conventional or nuclear ballistic missile firing.

Calculating precisely the trajectory of a ballistic missile is not an easy task. This is why during the Cold War the superpowers opted for an immediate nuclear response, or Launch on Warning, as the system surveyed the enemy’s launch, instead of waiting a minute more than necessary. Regardless, it is impossible that the launch of an S.L.B.M. would not cause:

1. An immediate rise in the strategic forces level of alert;
2. The red alert for all national air defense forces;
3. The preparation for possible retaliations.

The fact that the Trident D-5 would be fired by submarines and not from land, however, would diminish the risks of misinterpretation by Russian and Chinese elites since the trajectory would be easier to calculate. Moreover, should the United States fire a single missile (for instance, against a terror cell), the worries of a full-scale attack against the national territory would be considerably less.

In spite of these aspects, such parameters for calculating expectations and possible reactions are entirely American. During the Cold War, Russian military elites, for instance, considered that a single launch by the United States could have been a fake exercise and instead a concealed attack. It is difficult to imagine, then, that the launch of a Trident D-5 would cause world powers to simply believe that the attack was against a terrorist headquarters and not an attempt to behead political and military leaders in a surprise attack.

In 1995, the launch of a Norwegian experimental missile was wrongly interpreted by Moscow as being an S.L.B.M. launched by N.A.T.O. For four minutes, Russian forces were ready to launch a catastrophic nuclear retaliation strike against the Atlantic organization. Since the Russian Federation and China have boundaries with Iranian and North Korean territories, it is hard to imagine that a U.S.-fired ballistic missile would not cause anxiety in Moscow and Beijing.

A diplomatic solution to the problem would be for the United States to warn other countries right before a launch, but for security reasons such an option seems unlikely. In the end, U.S. projects for a renovated ballistic missile offensive capability aimed at global strike potential raise just as many questions as the construction of military space-planes or other apparently futuristic solutions.

Europe and the U.S. Plan for an Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense System

E.U. members have generally regarded U.S. missile initiatives with suspicion. The above-mentioned projects of upgrading the ballistic potential have received criticism as Europeans tend to see such plans as being a threat to global stability. However, the U.S.-European debate has mostly concentrated on anti-ballistic missile defenses.

E.U. states may soon discover that Iran, and possibly Syria, could strike Central Europe with a ballistic missile. Furthermore, European elites share with the United States the preoccupation of North Korea’s aggressive anti-U.S. stance. In spite of such worries, however, the United States and its European allies perceive the matter differently. The reason for that divergence is that Europeans have a different strategic culture, which was determined by history and is unlikely to change any time soon.

First of all, European states are used to potential aggressors in their backyard, and tend to consider intentions, rather than capabilities, as the decisive factor to orient their strategies. In other words, for France, Germany, or Italy, the fact that Iran is unlikely to launch a ballistic missile against them is more important than the fact that Tehran will soon possess such ballistic missiles, capable of reaching European soil.

Second, E.U. members are opposed to any move that could change the military balance since they tend to believe that cooperation and engagement are the best policies toward actual or alleged rogue states, and because most European elites worry that U.S. anti-ballistic missile plans will ruin U.S.-Russian bilateral relations — with dire consequences for the E.U.’s relations with both powers.

Moreover, the E.U. member-states often believe that U.S. security concerns with Iran and North Korea are exaggerated and that Washington’s doctrine of preemption is the problem, not the solution, to current security issues.

Therefore, the Euro-American strategic debate over ballistic missile defense is difficult. Washington can count on solid allies like the United Kingdom and Poland, but the very structure of the European Union will make the decision in favor of an integrated transatlantic B.M.D. system difficult.

However, since Iran and other countries will likely acquire the necessary technology to potentially strike European soil, a strategic decision will soon be needed. Since the Europeans are likely to get involved in major crisis management through N.A.T.O. (and the ongoing Lebanese conflict may soon be a test of this), they may be targeted by a country that is at war with the United States.

Therefore, if European states are to preserve their capability to act militarily together with Washington in major crises, they will have to consider how to cope with possible deterrence exerted by powers equipped with long-range ballistic missiles. It is possible that the widespread perception (in Europe) that siding with Washington is against national security interests will be increased by the fact that states like Iran are close to acquiring enhanced missile technology.

On the other hand, since the European Security and Defense Policy (E.S.D.P.) is conceived as being part of the Atlantic Alliance, and not an alternative to it, European states will likely opt for a renewal of their strategic partnership with Washington. As a consequence, they do not have an interest in leaving the United States to face the new threats alone, or in seeing American defensive capabilities weakened. This will be even more true as states that are involved in ballistic missile proliferation are almost always also nuclear proliferators, since ballistic missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

Ballistic missiles will be a dominating strategic issue in the coming years. Defense systems, even the most advanced ones, still suffer from serious flaws. These vulnerabilities will result in further calls for massive investment. Although Europe still seems divided over the issue, it will soon have to make important decisions since Iran and other states that the West considers controversial are increasing their offensive military capabilities.

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Federico Bordonaro, Giuseppe Anzera

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader.