Federico Bordonaro

Very interesting paragraph taken from the annual “Strategic Survey” published by London’s IISS. Every now and then, someone asserts that nation-states are dead and geopolitics obsolete. Now, almost in the year 2010, can we say that these fancy predictions were accurate? The answer is a resounding NO.

Moving into 2010, many of the ambitious foreign-policy agendas and practices established by Western powers in the previous decade and a half appear in retreat. What appetite will there be for the ‘nation-building’ projects that were thought at once strategically necessary and morally desirable? The efforts in Iraq are bound to become modest. Those in Afghanistan, especially as the economic crisis continues and the magnitude of the challenge becomes ever more evident, will naturally become minimalist, at least in comparison to the original design. New projects seem unlikely to be undertaken and would have trouble garnering public support except in the most exceptional of circumstances. What appeals for humanitarian intervention will be answered? The so-called ‘responsibility to protect’ has been advanced as an international imperative, though often with Western impetus, in the face of acts of genocide or equivalent natural tragedies. A sense of natural human charity persists even in times of grave economic crisis. But tragedies in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and elsewhere have not resulted in the concerted international action for which so many campaigners have pleaded. The static or declining military budgets of European powers place limits on expeditionary capacities already stretched by operations thought to be of strategic vital national interest. Rising powers in Asia, and elsewhere, are still more reluctant to ‘interfere in the internal affairs’ of others. The survivability of doctrines like the responsibility to protect and humanitarian intervention will depend on countries outside the West adopting them more fully than has heretofore been evident.

The intellectual habit in the West has recently become to align national or alliance strategic interests with the delivery of a global public good. It may be that budgetary constraints and the disillusions of recent experience will inspire more political leaders to move from the poetic towards the more prosaic end of the strategic spectrum: defining goals more crisply in terms of clear national interest rather than acts of wider strategic charity. Emerging countries may need to move in the other direction and find some way to define the advance of a wider public good as in their national interest. Rising powers, if they are truly to rise, will only achieve genuine prominence if they are to shape the wider order in which they live. This rebalancing will take time, and may not have wholly beneficial effects. In some areas, like climate change, it may be that Western powers will continue to provide the impetus for an effective global regime, though one will not emerge without key participation from the bigger rising powers. But other causes will need champions from emerging power centres. As time passes, the limitations on Western and US foreign and security policy may become more evident. Domestically Obama may have campaigned on the theme ‘yes we can’; internationally he may increasingly have to argue ‘no we can’t’.

Moldova Urges Russian Troops to Quit Rebel Region

Moldova’s new Western-leaning leadership, in an early challenge to Moscow, said on Thursday it would press Russia to withdraw its soldiers from the country’s breakaway Transdniestria region.

Russia has a peacekeeping force of around 1,200 soldiers stationed since 1992 in the rebel territory, a mainly Russian-speaking sliver of land bordering Ukraine.

The context is fluid. Transnistria, together with Crimea, is one of the potential flashpoints in Eastern Europe. Let’s see how this develops and what ramifications it may cause for the WBSR.

In light of this week’s decision by the Obama Administration to scrap U.S. plans for an anti-missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, and of NATO Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s proposal of a possible joint U.S.-Russian-NATO missile shield, I re-post an analysis that I wrote for PINR with Dr. Giuseppe Anzera back in July 2006 on the ballistic missiles issue.

25 July 2006
‘‘Ballistic Missiles: A Crucial Strategic Issue for the United States and Europe'’

hile the mainstream media has covered the question of nuclear proliferation in recent years, ballistic missile proliferation is emerging as an increasingly crucial, yet less publicized, strategic issue. On July 4, for example, North Korea tested a Taepodong-2 missile. Five days later, India fired an Agni class missile. Both tests failed, but they signaled how enhanced missile technology will soon be available for these two states. While India is a solid democracy and is even courted by Washington as a new strategic partner, the same is not true for North Korea.

There are two fundamental aspects in the evolution process of today’s ballistic missiles. The first one is the effort made by so-called rogue states, such as North Korea and Iran, to upgrade their offensive capabilities quickly as a result of more powerful and longer range ballistic missiles. The second one is the different perceptions existing in the United States and the European Union about both offensive and defensive missile technologies. Such divergence, caused by historical and geostrategic issues, may hinder the birth of an integrated, transatlantic, missile defense system.

Historical Background

Ballistic missiles have been at the core of global security matters before, such as during the Cold War. In the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union gradually reached the conclusion that increasingly sophisticated anti-ballistic missile defense systems were responsible for bringing more instability to the global military balance since better defenses stimulated an offensive arms race to counter those defenses. Therefore, in 1972, Washington and Moscow signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (A.B.M.) treaty, widely considered as one of the pillars of global security agreements.

The A.B.M. treaty had been signed in a broader historical context when the two world powers were already engaged in a series of talks called the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (S.A.L.T.) aimed at limiting the number of strategic ballistic missiles possessed by the superpowers. According to such agreements, new Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (I.C.B.M.), as well as Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (S.L.B.M.), could only be added to existing arsenals after older ones were eliminated.

The period between 1969 and 1972 set the stage for a new military balance that lasted until the end of the Cold War, notwithstanding a serious crisis in Soviet-American politico-strategic relations in the early 1980s as a result of the Reagan-sponsored Strategic Defense Initiative (S.D.I.), launched on March 26, 1983, when Reagan declared the S.D.I. to be consistent with the A.B.M. treaty. However, already in the 1990s, the altered geostrategic context as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union caused many U.S. strategists to rethink the missile defense issue.

(more…)

Rumors of a U.S. back down on BMD in Europe appeared in the press on Sept. 16.
The New York Times reports on Sept. 17 that

The Obama team relied heavily on research by a Stanford University physicist, Dean Wilkering, who presented the government with research this year arguing that Poland and the Czech Republic were not the most effective places to station a missile defense system against the most likely Iranian threat. Instead, he said, more optimal places to station missiles and radar systems would be in Turkey or the Balkans.

“If you move the system down closer to the Middle East,” it would “make more sense for the defense of Europe, Mr. Wilkering said in an interview.

Mr. Wilkering said the new administration did not want to simply abandon missile defense but orient it for a different threat than the Bush team saw. “The Obama administration is more interested in missile defense as a valuable instrument, a valuable aspect of our military posture than I would have thought,” he said. Beyond moving the system from Eastern Europe, the Obama team concluded that the advantage of using the smaller SM-3 interceptors is that they have been proven effective and can be deployed sooner than the ground-based interceptors that the Bush team was still developing.

In any case, the matter should be followed closely, since the political/strategic implications are wide. For instance, the U.S. may be trying to trade-off the BMD in Eastern Europe with Russia’s diplomatic support on the Iranian nuclear question. Moreover, Poland risks to be forced to review its overall strategy of military modernization, that was predicated upon a strong partnership with Washington.
Things appear to be in flux, but once again the BMD project shows its tremendous complexity both at the technical and the diplomatic-strategic level.

Why the hurry?. Interview for RFERL on the Caspian summit without Iran.
Update on the summit:

Berdymukhammedov’s statement cited the “bright future” of pipeline projects to export Turkmen gas. A pipeline to China is due to start operating at the end of this year. It should eventually pump some 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually. The Turkmen president also mentioned a proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline project that would export slightly less gas (some 27-33 bcm annually).

Berdymukhammedov added that Turkmenistan, with the fourth-largest gas reserves in the world, has sufficient reserves to supply the European Union-backed Nabucco pipeline project (31 bcm annually).

But Berdymukhammedov avoided mention of gas supplies to Russia or of plans to repair a gas pipeline linking the two countries that was damaged by an explosion in April.

The Turkmen government has blamed Russia for the explosion, which happened as Russia’s Gazprom was pressing Turkmenistan to lower the price for its gas supplies. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was due to travel after the talks to Turkmenistan, where he would have more opportunity to address bilateral issues.

The Pri-Caspian pipeline project — planned to bring Turkmen, Kazakh, and Uzbek gas to Russia via a pipeline along the northeastern Caspian coast — was also notable for its absence from Berdymukhammedov’s statement. All four countries agreed to that project in 2007, but there has been little movement of late aside from Kazakhstan’s pledge on September 11 that it would start laying sections of that pipeline in 2010.

The Turkmen statement was released to mark the “Day of Oil, Gas, Electrical Workers and Geologists” in that country.

But the fact that it coincided with the Caspian talks suggests it was an effort to give the Turkmen president extra leverage in talks with his three counterparts at the summit.

Of the three projects mentioned by Berdymukhammedov’s office, only the Western-backed Nabucco project would involve any of the other three countries represented in Kazakhstan (Azerbaijan via a yet-to-be-built trans-Caspian pipeline).

Excluding Iran

The leaders had said in their opening statements that no major decisions on use of the Caspian would be made in the absence of the only littoral state not in attendance, Iran.

Tehran was not invited to the talks and complained bitterly this week about its exclusion.

Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, suggested there are many topics that the four leaders from Caspian states also allied within the CIS can discuss more effectively without non-member Iran.

Interview for RFERL on the hypothesis of a gas cartel.

It’s enough to send a chill, figuratively and literally, down the spines of energy consumers: the creation of a cartel of natural-gas producers. It would be an organization akin to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the body so many blame when the price of gasoline starts to rise.

“A gas cartel, should it see the light, would mean that producer countries would augment their power even more and that they could have a stronger say on gas prices,” says Federico Bordonaro, a senior analyst with equilibri.net, an Italian-based analytical group specializing in risk assessment.