Federico Bordonaro

I wrote in 2005 that Pakistan’s geopolitical importance was on the rise. I considered mainly Pakistan’s position (a strategic link between the Middle East’s Arabian Sea region, South Asia, and Central Asia) and its value for China and the US from a security point of view, especially in terms of maritime power and strategic route. Especially the US cannot afford to see Pakistan disintegrate, because such a development would likely trigger a shift in the region geopolitical orientation (from a pro-Western to an unknown but probably anti-Western alignment).
I also considered the Pakistan-India problem to be a key issue: Pakistan’s destabilization may add to Indo-Pakistani tensions and could potentially trigger a new conflict, which, because of the two states’s nuclear capabilities, is among the most dangerous ones in today’s international relations.

Now, four years later, it is clear that the possibility of a progressive disintegration of Pakistan is to be taken seriously.
In the early 2000s, US geopolitical analyst and geographer Saul B. Cohen launched the hypothesis of a “Pashtunistan” taking shape as a result of US destruction of the Taliban regime and serious instability in Pakistan’s remote regions. This would have triggered a major geopolitical change in Central-South Asia, with Afghanistan and Pakistan de facto disintegrating.
The hypothesis might have seemed too bold, but some of the world’s most important newspapers now utilize the concept.

The situation is confused and it’s not at all clear if it is possible to speak about a “talibanization” of the country. What is sure is that Balochistan, Waziristan, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas are caught in a struggle, in which both ethno-religious and territorial aspects are concerned.

Pepe Escobar wrote on May 9 for Asia Times that

Balochistan is totally under the radar of Western corporate media. But not the Pentagon’s. An immense desert comprising almost 48% of Pakistan’s area, rich in uranium and copper, potentially very rich in oil, and producing more than one-third of Pakistan’s natural gas, it accounts for less than 4% of Pakistan’s 173 million citizens. Balochs are the majority, followed by Pashtuns. Quetta, the provincial capital, is considered Taliban Central by the Pentagon […].

For the US, the Afghan operation has become the “AfPak” issue. Max Hastings, in today’s Financial Times, explains the problem clearly:

It is frustrating for the US government to be making strategy for a battlefield while knowing that the strategic outcome will be decided on another one. The current redeployments in Afghanistan are taking place in the knowledge that Pakistan matters much more. The most important change in the thinking of Washington and its allies over the past year derives from recognition they are fighting the wrong war, or at least running a sideshow.

The purpose of the 2001 US invasion was to deny sanctuary to terrorists based in Afghanistan. Yet al-Qaeda today plays only a marginal role in that country, while being deeply rooted in Pakistan. Western forces find themselves engaged in an ill-defined campaign to stabilise Afghan tribal society, while being unable to use troops across the border, where most Pakistanis are bitterly hostile to the US. […]

The most obvious feature of the Afghan war in the months ahead is that it will become, in the phrase of indiscreet US soldiers, “re-Americanised”. The Americans perceive Nato as lacking both means and will to grip the situation. The most important priority for Washington is to determine exactly what its soldiers hope to accomplish, rather than making it up as they go along.

The result is that Pakistan is even more a geopolitical crux today than it was four years ago. It has incresingly attracted US military energies from the Afghan theatre. It has also forced India to re-focus its attention on the Pakistani militants issue after the Mumbay attacks. And it will take a long time before the situation becomes clearer. Expect the AfPak problem to dominate the US foreign policy agenda for the rest of this year and to impact the debate on NATO’s future.