Federico Bordonaro

Third part of the interview on current geopolitics with Exploring Geopolitics. This section focus on Russia and the Former Warsaw Pact area.

Second part of the interview with Exploring Geopolitics.

France is about to re-enter NATO’s integrated command. This is a sea-change in French defence policy, and will have important consequences for Europe. Paris has been the champion of Europe’s strategic autonomy from the US and NATO, but now it has abandoned its Gaullist orientation. France’s opposition to US foreign policy in the 2000s (see the Iraqi war) has not brought about the formation of a European strategic core in the sense that Paris hoped; instead, it has caused deep divisions within Europe, and therefore a malfunctioning of Europe’s political engine.

Moreover, Europeans don’t spend much on defence. Only the UK (that is, a staunch US ally) spends about 2% of its GDP for defence; the average defence spending in the EU is 1.7%, which does not allow Europe to live up to its previous ambitions and expectations.

Therefore, the emerging trend is that Europe wants NATO to be reinforced, and ESDP to be developed in coordination with NATO and the US. European elites want a new era of Trans-Atlantic cooperation in strategic matters, although different perceptions will continue to cause misunderstanding or malaise at times. One of the most difficult issues to solve is that the US wants Europe to spend more on defence and to get more involved in Afghanistan. Europeans have much trouble in satisfying such requests.

But one thing seems clear to me: the EU is not becoming a world power in the true sense; it is becoming an increasingly important diplomatic player, but it will continue to need the US and NATO to project power.

First part of an interview of mine, published by ExploringGeopolitics.org, a website run by Leohnardt van Efferink.

[…] while many observers maintain that the current international economical and financial crisis will impact global geopolitics, what evidence do we have that such deep economic crises usually affect geopolitical realities? If we look at history (the only guide we have, albeit sometimes difficult to use), we should reflect upon the geopolitical consequences of the 1929 crisis. Not because that crisis is identical to today’s one – it’s not – but because we have to grasp the causal link between international economic crises and geopolitics. Surprisingly, we find that geopolitical reality is not so much affected by such crises. For instance, the United States was a rising power in 1929. Although very heavily affected by the crisis, it continued its rise and became even stronger in the 1940s, mainly for strategic-military reasons and their impact on the US economy.

Policy brief sull’Uzbekistan (in PDF), scritta per l’ISPI.

Abstract in English:

Uzbekistan’s ambitious foreign policy is aimed at winning back its Central Asian pivot state role. Historical, geographic, and military factors appear to pave the way for its successful attempt at gaining the status of indispensable ally of Central Asia.

However, serious economic and demographic problems cripple Tashkent’s ability to bid for regional hegemony, while geopolitical disputes on water management and energy supplies complicate its relations with neighbouring states Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

The US and Europe aim at improving Uzbek-Western relations, but must confront Islam Karimov’s brutal regime, which slows down the rapprochement.

Geoffrey Sloan gives his advice on what to read on geopolitics. A useful list for students.

Theorizing about the relationship between geography and security is one of the oldest and most central themes of Western political science. Modern geopolitical thinking appeared in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, differing from its predecessors in its emphasis on technological change and global systems of power. In vogue before and through the world wars, geopolitics fell out of favor by the second half of the century, accused of everything from environmental determinism to simplistic binary categorization. Today, however, the subject is undergoing a revival — perhaps based on the recognition that global political changes in the twenty-first century may stem not simply from human culture and institutions but also the geographical environment.

Nucleare, ambiente e sicurezza degli approvvigionamenti: i temi caldi avanzati dai grandi dell’Europa.
Analisi per il portale AGI-Energia.

Several media report these days the overtures made by U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, to Moscow, on issues such as the proposed anti-ballistic missiles defense system in Central Europe, cooperation on Iran’s missile and nuclear threats, and on Afghanistan’s logistical problem.

U.S.-Russian talks will concentrate first on the possible renewal of the START treaty. But the Russians will push for a “grand bargain” between Moscow and Washington, since, as I’ve stated several times in the last years, they feel that the systemic context of international relations has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. Russia wants to avoid two things in the first place: (a) U.S. deep political-military penetration into Russia’s “Near Abroad” via-NATO, and (b) being considered just a junior partner in East-West strategic relations. In other words, Russo-American political-strategic relations are conditioned by security and prestige considerations alike — not a novelty at all in history.

In order to achieve its goals, Russia must stop NATO’s enlargement and maintain maximum influence on politics in Ukraine and Georgia. Moscow must also signal to Lithuania, Poland, and the Czech Republic that the Americans will negotiate with Russia before taking into consideration the three countries’ anti-Russian orientation. Russian foreign policy in Transcaucasia, Eastern and Central Europe has used the threat of force, force (the Georgian war), and energy security as leverage in order to achieve such goals, at a time when the U.S. was “stuck” in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Moreover, Russia’s flirts with the rogue states and militias in the Middle East, as well as its diplomacy towards Hugo Chavez in the last years were aimed at putting irritants into U.S. grand strategy that could be then used as leverage to take the Americans to a negotiating table.

Now, while it’s very difficult to predict how Russo-American talks will end up, it is already possible to identify some obvious diplomatic and geopolitical implications of Hillary Clinton’s overtures to Moscow. From a diplomatic point of view, Washington is colder toward Warsaw, Vilnius, and Prague than it was only a few months ago. This will in turn weaken the “New Europe’s” political weight inside the E.U., and it may open a window of opportunity for France and Germany to re-launch a more “Carolingian” view of European Security and Defense Policy, i.e., a stronger role for Europe under the leadership of Paris and Berlin. However, this would take time and diplomatic ability.

From a “global geopolitical” point of view, better U.S.-Russian relations spell problems for China. The fundamental power triangle of the current geopolitical phase is the U.S.-Russia-China one. Now, if Russia and the U.S. succeed in a strategic rapprochement, China’s leverage against the U.S. in the south-eastern and north-eastern Rimland gets diminished. Moreover, if Russo-American cooperation helps stabilizing Afghanistan and crippling Iranian defense ambitions, U.S. politico-military energies may be freed to be used effectively elsewhere than in the “Greater Middle East”. And for China, that’s again bad news. Let’s not forget that China’s rise as a global power would be only assured if Beijing can maintain a firm grip on its peripheries (Tibet, Xin-Jiang) and, most of all, if it can achieve regional hegemony in its maritime area. An American power freed by the Iraqi and Afghan “traps” and nearer to Moscow would certainly be much more able to throw its weight behind China’s strategic rivals: Taiwan’s nationalists, South Korea, Japan, and Australia, but also more Tibetan and possibly Uighur separatists.

In the end, the above mentioned developments remain hypothetical, because we can’t be sure about the success of Russo-American talks and rapprochement. However, U.S. changing diplomatic relations with Russia are certain to trigger far-reaching consequences.

Howard Davies in today’s Financial Times:

The painful financial crisis has challenged the economic orthodoxies of all developed country governments. Long-cherished beliefs in balanced budgets have been abandoned. In Europe the stability and growth pact has vanished from view. British prime minister Gordon Brown’s golden rule has been melted down and sold with the family silver.

But an even bigger challenge has been posed to the political projects of western governments of the centre left and centre right. In the economic sphere they can look back to Keynes for intellectual underpinning of the new fiscal realism forced upon them. Politically, explaining the new role of the state is more difficult. Where should the government intervene and how? Public ownership may be unavoidable in the short term, but what is the endgame? Are present conditions an aberration, or will we need to contemplate a new social contract between the state and the markets for the long term? In the UK, are we witnessing the death throes of Thatcher-Blairism, and if so what rough beast slouches toward Westminster to be born?

Something interesting is happening. After a decade when British style free-marketism was rampant, and the Franco-German model of “social market economy” was ridiculed and lambasted, the ongoing crisis is causing a reversal in economic thinking. It is too soon to hypothesize a long-term shift in the relationship between the State and markets. However, it is not too soon to ask whether such new statism could bring about a deeper political change. Will Europe emerge as some scholars have imagined it some years ago? A Europe predicated upon a model very different from the US-British one? Two solid traditions may be revived here: Gaullism and Social-democracy. They seemed in their final crisis just a few months ago. They may be in for a revival.