Federico Bordonaro

Will Russia and Georgia fight a second round next Summer? Analyst Pavel Felgenhauer thinks so.
Interestingly, his reasoning is focused on geography and geopolitics, even if he doesn’t explicitly mentions the two factors:

The first war — which Felgenhauer predicted long before its onset — was seen as recompense for Russia’s antipathy toward Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and his determined pursuit of NATO membership. But Felgenhauer says there is more to Moscow’s long-term strategy: “[Russia] may not like Saakashvili, we may not like NATO, but there is also another thing: Armenia is cut off; [Russian] troops in Armenia are cut off. There’s no transit by land. That means technology cannot be taken out of there for repairs or modernization, and technology cannot be taken in, other than by air. Such a situation cannot last long.”

The Armenian bases are important to Moscow, Felgenhauer argues, as a symbol of Russian ambitions in the South Caucasus. Armenia is a close Russian ally, but its isolation could cause Yerevan to “start looking the other way,” Felgenhauer says. Russia’s subjugation of Georgia would remove that threat, and would in turn isolate Azerbaijan, which is currently resisting Russia and putting out feelers to the EU and the United States.

Felgenhauer predicts that the next Russian assault on Georgia will be a “war to a victorious end.” He predicts its main theater could be the road between Gori and Mtshketa just outside Tbilisi. But, Felgenhauer says, Tbilisi itself would not be the Russian army’s top strategic objective: “What is important is not so much Tbilisi. But west of Tbilisi there is the Tbilisi international airport [and] many airfields.” This is important, Felgenhauer said, “because right now in South Ossetia we do not have a single permanent airstrip, as the terrain is highly uneven.”

The closest Russian air base is currently in Beslan, in North Ossetia.

The best time for war, according to Felgenhauer, would be between June and August, when high mountain passes are free of snow. He said Russian forces would also need at least two months in hand to wind down operations before winter returns in October.

Felgenhauer discounts the eventuality of an intervention on the part of the United States. He notes President Barack Obama’s main goal is victory in Afghanistan, to effect which he will need to transit supplies and men through Russia and countries in its sphere of influence. In exchange, the thinking in Moscow goes, the United States will be willing to trade its interest in Georgia.

Thus, to Felgenhauer’s mind, a war is all but inevitable. “The only way you could avoid it,” he says, “is if there’s regime change in Tbilisi — or regime change in Moscow.”

Berlin fears that Ukraine’s rapprochement with Europe and NATO will strain relations with Moscow.
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Germany’s Foreign Minister, also adds a provocative question:
“If you say Yes to Ukraine, what do we do in Moldova or in Georgia? Where does it begin, and where will it end? Can you restrict it to Ukraine?”

Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has been a high priority for German foreign policy. Russia has never come to terms with the idea of the country being independent – Vladimir Putin, then Russian president, said as much when he attended last year’s Nato summit in Bucharest. It is a vital conduit for 80 per cent of Europe’s natural gas supplies from Russia, as last month’s total shutdown of the transit pipes demonstrated.

Berlin wants stability in Ukraine, to avoid creating the grounds for any unnecessary conflict with Moscow. Russia wants a compliant government in Kiev that does not talk about joining Nato and does not control the transit routes for Russia’s gas supplies to Europe.

Mr Steinmeier’s concern, however, is that instead there is “complete deadlock” in the Ukrainian political process with the stand-off between the president, Viktor Yushchenko, and the premier, Yulia Tymoshenko.

It undermines attempts to draft a recovery programme in the face of a collapse in gross domestic product – down 20 per cent in the 12 months to January.

Volume a cura di Aldo Ferrari, pubblicato dall’ISPI e disponibile in PDF, con due miei saggi:

Armenia, Azerbaigian, Georgia: elezioni, tendenze politiche e scenari nel contesto caucasico, pp. 84-117

e

L’Unione Europea di fronte alla crisi georgiana, pp. 143-151.

Il Caucaso in una prospettiva europea si inserisce nell’ambito di una ricerca nata dalla collaborazione tra il Ministero degli Affari Esteri e l’Ispi che in un recente passato ha già prodotto una serie di studi dedicati a diverse tematiche – politiche, economiche, socio-culturali – concernenti il Caucaso e l’Asia centrale1. Tale anali-si costituisce inoltre uno strumento di preparazione della Conferenza Internazionale “Ue e Caucaso: stabilità, sicurezza, progresso” organizzata dal Ministero degli Af-fari Esteri e inizialmente prevista per il 13 novembre.
Il tema di questa ricerca è divenuto di particolare interesse dopo lo scoppio, in agosto, del conflitto russo-georgiano: l’artefice di una crisi internazionale tanto grave, da minacciare non solo la stabilità della regione caucasica, ma anche i rap-porti tra la Russia e l’Occidente. La cosiddetta guerra d’Ossetia è infatti esplosa improvvisamente, ma non inaspettata, è stata originata da uno dei tre principali conflitti del Caucaso meridionale rimasti irrisolti sin dagli anni Novanta, nonché da dinamiche politiche e strategiche più recenti, che i diversi studi di questa ricerca si propongono di analizzare.
Dalla dissoluzione dell’Urss nel 1991 il Caucaso appare ancora oggi senza dubbio una della aree più conflittuali dello scenario internazionale. L’intera regione ha in effetti sofferto non solo a causa delle più vaste dinamiche post-sovietiche di transizione politica, sociale ed economica, ma anche per una situazione locale quanto mai particolare e problematica. L’intersezione dei conflitti interni, di carattere prevalentemente etno-territoriali, con lo scontro di contrastanti interessi ester-ni, sia politici che economici, ha fortemente pregiudicato lo sviluppo di questa re-gione. Tanto il Caucaso settentrionale, ancora inserito nella Federazione russa, quanto le tre repubbliche indipendenti del Caucaso meridionale (Georgia, Armenia e Azerbaigian) hanno risentito in maniera negativa di questa situazione. Mentre il Caucaso settentrionale ha conosciuto la tragedia cecena, che ha avuto pesanti ricadute socio-economiche sulle altre regioni caucasiche della Federazione russa, quello meridionale è stato destabilizzato non tanto dai già ricordati conflitti etno-territoriali, quanto dall’incapacità di giungere a una loro soluzione; al tempo stesso, le dinamiche politiche, sociali ed economiche di questi paesi sono state quanto mai negative nei primi anni successivi all’indipendenza.

AP reports today that

President Barack Obama’s go-slow approach to missile defenses in Europe is stirring speculation that he is planning either to deep-freeze the costly project he inherited from the Bush administration or use it as a bargaining chip in broader security talks with Russia.

Is that true? What we know is that Russia’s sabre rattling and often hostile stances towards the US in these last years were aimed at taking the Americans back to the negotiating table, and not at launching “Cold War 2″, as many analysts incorrectly interpreted.
However, current negotiations on Afghanistan (Russian support for logistics) and BMD are linked to Russia’s long-term goals in Western Eurasia (especially in South Caucasus and Ukraine), where Moscow wants to rebuild a sphere of influence and thus wants to keep NATO out. The stakes are high, and deals with Washington may well fail, paving the way for many years of strained politico-strategic relations between Russia and the US.

“Turkmenistan has the potential to emerge as a top gas-producing nation, making the Nabucco pipeline to Europe likely, company officials said.”

This UPI analysis highlights Ashgabat’s growing importance in EU’s energy security prospects. Will Europe be able to forge strong diplomatic and commercial relations with the Turkmens?

“There are several meetings planned for the Nabucco pipeline in 2009, with a key meeting scheduled tentatively in Ankara in April. Turkey would host the largest portion of the pipeline.
Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek plans to discuss Nabucco Friday during a visit to Turkmenistan. The Czech Republic holds the EU presidency currently.”

Robert Cutler lucidly analyzes the rationale for a Trans-Caspian Pipeline - one that could decisevely enhance the Nabucco project, otherwise unlikely to get funded…

As Russia and China seek to augment their influence over the development of Kazakhstan’s energy production, Astana looks for other routes to overcome the restraints. The reinvigoration since 2007 of prospects for a Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) with Turkmenistan’s participation creates the possibility for Kazakhstan, which already cooperates with Azerbaijan on trans-Caspian oil shipments, to participate also with gas exports. Delays in the development of the offshore Kashagan field make associated gas from the onshore Tengiz oilfield the first candidate for such exports.