Federico Bordonaro

Per il Jane’s Information Group:

[…] Overall Russia now holds the ascendancy and, having removed Georgian forces from South Ossetia and also potentially Abkhazia, is likely to seek at least a restoration of the pre-conflict state of de facto independence for both separatist regions, albeit with an increased Russian military presence. This would leave Georgia with reduced control over both separatist regions, severely degraded military capabilities and greatly reduced prospects for making progress towards NATO membership over the short to medium term. Domestically, President Saakashvili, having staked so much on the restoration of Georgian control over its separatist regions, is also likely to face a growing challenge.

Secondo Stratfor:

[…] Stopping has given Russia the veneer of legitimacy in its military campaign, while achieving what it mainly sought out to do: break Georgia, make the country unattractive to the West as a candidate to join its alliances, become the hero again in the former Soviet states and show that the United States’ security guarantees were mainly show.

Per Oxford Analytica:

[…] Russian forces will adhere to Medvedev’s order, but Georgian troops or irregulars might continue sporadic attacks on Russian positions. The Kremlin’s attention will now shift towards resolving the conflict in its favour, and Medvedev will place a premium on being perceived as a peacemaker who has taken the initiative to halt hostilities. Russia will continue to reject what it views as Western-imposed solutions; the Kremlin could accept an international civilian humanitarian presence in Georgia, but will refuse any proposal which calls for a multinational military peace-keeping force.

Più in generale, oggi la stampa occidentale più attenta (dall’International Herald Tribune al Figaro, da Asia Times Online alla Neue Zuercher Zeitung) mette in luce come qualcosa sia cambiato profondamente.

Per George Friedman, CEO di Stratfor,

[…] The war in Georgia […] is Russia’s public return to great power status. This is not something that just happened — it has been unfolding ever since Putin took power, and with growing intensity in the past five years. Part of it has to do with the increase of Russian power, but a great deal of it has to do with the fact that the Middle Eastern wars have left the United States off-balance and short on resources. As we have written, this conflict created a window of opportunity. The Russian goal is to use that window to assert a new reality throughout the region while the Americans are tied down elsewhere and dependent on the Russians. The war was far from a surprise; it has been building for months. But the geopolitical foundations of the war have been building since 1992. Russia has been an empire for centuries. The last 15 years or so were not the new reality, but simply an aberration that would be rectified. And now it is being rectified.

E’ un mutamento d’epoca. Quel che fino a un lustro fa sembrava improbabile si è materializzato rapidamente sotto gli occhi di USA ed Europa; la fase apertasi nel periodo 1989-92 è terminata. Forse ancor più importante è il fatto che la “battaglia per l’Eurasia”, così tipica della geopolitica moderna e contemporanea, è entrata in una nuova, ennesima fase. Al di là di tutti i discorsi sul ruolo degli stati nazionali, la globalizzazione, le organizzazioni internazionali, ecc., quel che emerge è che le costanti della competizione geopolitica rimangono le stesse:

• La grande sfera geostrategica euro-atlantica si scontra infatti con quella nord-eurasiatica a dominanza russa;
• sorgono nuovi poli geostrategici (Cina);
• rimane d’assoluta rilevanza la competizione fra stati per le risorse strategiche;
• l’uso della forza militare, o la sua minaccia, modellano le relazioni politico-diplomatiche e politico-economiche fra le potenze;
• i clivages etno-religiosi e identitari creano conflitti locali in cui si inseriscono le grandi potenze.