Federico Bordonaro

Contrariamente a molte percezioni delle ultime settimane di campagna elettorale, in Parlamento siederà una maggioranza sufficientemente ampia per garantire stabilità.
Le principali sfide politiche italiane sul breve-medio termine:
1. Il rapporto interno alla coalizione vincintrice di centrodestra, anche alla luce del grande successo leghista;
2. La capacità del PD di rafforzarsi e di proseguire sulla strada tracciata;
3. La capacità dei due poli di dialogare efficacemente sulle riforme istituzionali, proseguendo nella semplificazione del sistema, in attesa del referendum del 2009;
4. La necessità di far fronte al rallentamento dell’economia nell’area euro-atlantica

Più in generale, l’Italia deve trovare una linea politica in grado di garantirne crescita, stabilità, prosperità e sicurezza in un mutato quadro geopolitico e demografico euro-mediterraneo (analisi del 13.6.2005):

Geopolitical and Demographic Aspects of the Italian Crisis

Since 1989, Italy’s political and economic discourse has been dominated by issues that are both geopolitical and economic in nature. European political and economic integration has been the dominating theme and the official goal of all governments since then. At the same time, relentless rhetoric about the importance of knowledge, technology innovation, and education as the real “capital” of the 21st century has been divulged by almost all politicians and decision makers. After 15 years, however, it appears that Italy’s integration into the E.U. is not bringing the desired effects citizens were told it would, and it must be pointed out how almost nothing has been done to put into practice the good words on education, research and technology.

In fact, Italy is increasingly dependent upon the U.S. for its security and foreign policy, and upon the E.U. for its economic policy. It’s easy to show how European integration and the E.U.’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (C.F.S.P.) — which have progressed in the last 15 years — have not led Rome to a clear reassessment of its foreign policy in the direction of a European solidarity advocated by Paris and Berlin. During the 2003 Iraq crisis, Italy did not follow the Franco-German combine’s diplomatic strategy and, instead, joined the U.S.-U.K. line, together with Poland and other European states. Before that, Rome had already upset Paris by refusing to buy Airbus’ A-400M military transport aircraft and by planning to buy the Joint Strike Fighter, a multi-role U.S. fighter aircraft in direct competition with European projects.

From a geoeconomic point of view, Italy’s struggle to be accepted into the Euro-zone has caused the country’s economic policy — already confronted by an enormous public debt — to be almost completely directed toward this goal. As a result, in order to submit to an E.U. demanding the Growth and Stability Pact’s rules, Rome has lost the capability to bring on any ambitious public spending policy.

These two geopolitical underlying facts — the persistence of a U.S.-centric foreign policy and the rise of the European Union — concurred in hampering the emergence of policies suited to safeguard Italy’s prosperity, security and competitiveness. At the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Italian Education Minister Letizia Moratti significantly responded to university researchers, who were protesting because of the lack of funding and jobs, explaining that Italy’s commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan demanded economic sacrifices and, therefore, a change in the destination of economic resources was needed. However, the link between Italian military involvement in U.S.-led operations and the orientation of public spending tends to be underestimated by many observers. Similarly, the government’s programs for public works and infrastructures frequently clash against the E.U. Growth and Stability Pact’s strict rules concerning deficit limits.

Italian classical geopolitical interests — i.e. stability and security of the Euro-Mediterranean area and advantageous economic exchange with southeastern Europe and North African countries — seem to be subordinated to the U.S.’ “Greater Middle East” project and to the Franco-German political and economic leadership in the E.U. Italy’s integration into this latter has called for a set of demanding fiscal and financial policies, but a large part of the population observe that it hasn’t successfully protected its national interests against the rise of foreign competitors, China in particular. Some exponents of Berlusconi’s government have therefore called for the introduction of a customs duty by the E.U., a move which looks extremely complicated, both for its implications and because the European Union has been built upon free market principles.

At the same time, another fact is playing a decisive part in Italy’s depression: the demographic decline. No international power has ever succeeded in enhancing its interests and its viability as an influential geopolitical actor when caught in a serious demographic crisis. Italy is nowadays the E.U. country with the highest percentage of elderly, and its population is increasingly growing older. In the period of 1981-2001, the Italian population grew a tiny .8 percent. In the same years, the ratio of elderly among the citizens doubled. Subsequent troubles for the labor market and pensions are all too obvious. However, analysts often underestimate the consequences of the combination between political weakness and instability — a long-term Italian problem — and the demographic decline. The result is the inner rigidity of a system incapable of successfully renewing its decision makers and progressively more inclined to nepotism and corrupted methods of cooptation, making meritocracy and dynamism irrelevant rhetorical exercises.

A vicious circle is now at play: the demographic decline fosters the lack of change, thus worsening the country’s delay in innovation, research and job creation; these latter consequences urge the most talented minds to go abroad in search of well-paid jobs and prestige, plus a large part of the youth finds it hard to get married and have children. This fact makes the demographic decline clearly more acute.