Russia-Georgia: tensione in aumento, rischio anche

30/4/2008

I lettori del blog sanno che da oltre tre anni, sul PINR e su Equilibri.net, si è cercato di mettere in evidenza la pericolosità della tensione fra Mosca e Tbilisi e l’importanza dei conflitti “latenti” in Abkhazia e Ossezia del Sud.
Negli ultimi giorni la situazione si è ulteriormente complicata. La storia, se è di qualche insegnamento, ammonisce a non sottovalutare la questione. Un sostegno militare più forte ai separatisti da parte russa potrebbe portare a uno scontro, seppure indiretto, fra NATO e Russia in Transcaucasia.
Questo rischio è in ascesa, e lo è da tempo.
Scrivevamo il 2 ottobre 2006:

Russian troops in Georgia were put on “high alert” on Sunday and ordered to “shoot to kill if provoked” while defending Moscow’s two military bases in the Caucasian country. Tensions between Russia and Georgia are escalating after Tbilisi arrested four Russian officers on September 27 on spying charges.

As a consequence, Moscow withdrew its diplomats from Tbilisi and warned that it could postpone pulling out its troops by 2008 as initially planned. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told the press on September 27 that the situation is “very serious,” and, therefore, “when the U.N. Security Council will consider the Georgia-Abkhaz settlement in the next two weeks, we will insist on assessing Georgia’s activities as subversive.”

The crisis has its roots in the pro-Western, pro-U.S. turn of Georgian national elites epitomized by President Mikhail Saakashvili and his “Rose Revolution.” The situation had already worsened in August when Georgian security forces attempted to secure control of the Abkhazian river valley of the Kodori Gorge in order to regain control of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Tbilisi then called for the replacement of Russia as the official mediator in Georgia’s regional conflicts. Moscow maintains peacekeepers there along with two military bases.

This escalation signals that Georgia is likely to become the catalyst for U.S.-Russian geopolitical conflict for strategic and economic influence in the Caucasus.

C’è da chiedersi se il “timing” della decisione NATO - voluta dagli USA al meeting di Bucarest del 2-4 aprile - di un’accelerazione per l’integrazione georgiana nell’Alleanza Atlantica sia stato corretto. La NATO oggi ammonisce la Russia sui pericoli di un rafforzamento dell’appoggio ai separatisti, ma Mosca aveva già fatto sapere di non voler restare inerte di fronte alla penetrazione militare euro-atlantico in Transcaucasia.
Un conflitto nella regione sarebbe molto pericoloso, va da sé, data l’implicazione russa e americana. Ma anche sul piano economico/energetico, gli interessi europei sarebbero certamente minacciati. Peraltro, venti di guerra spirano anche in Azerbaigian, per via del conflitto con l’enclave armena del Nagorno-Karabakh.

Nazionalismo economico, patriottismo economico, globalizzazione

Sul “La Repubblica” del 30 aprile (inserto R2, pagg 46-47) Federico Rampini, commentando un’analisi molto dibattuta del Wall Street Journal, parla di “ritirata” della globalizzazione e di protezionismo in aumento. “Il mondo non è più piatto”, è la sintesi.
In due analisi sul PINR avevamo messo in luce la nuova tendenza già nel 2005-2006.
Dapprima, il 9 agosto 2005, Michael A. Weinstein notava come l’alt statunitense alle pretese della CNOOC e le tensioni USA-Giappone riguardo al Byrd Amendment fossero la spia di un “crescente nazionalismo economico”:

Signs of growing economic nationalism in the U.S. — where mounting, though still inchoate, popular resistance to liberalization of global markets finds resonance in Congress — do not portend a radical shift to protectionism, but a normalization of trade policy, in which internationalist and nationalist interests compete for influence in the state.

As rising economic powers throughout the world become more competitive, the U.S. is bound to lose comparative advantage in many industries, setting off moves for protection that will be opposed by industries that gain or maintain advantage.

Look for Washington to lose its role as leader in the drive for open markets and to become a player in a complex international system of markets that remain global but are hedged by restrictions and do not move in the direction of neo-liberal models of “free trade.”

The greatest threat to normal bargaining that would set off a decisive tendency toward protectionism would be the mobilization of popular nationalist sentiment that political classes are unable to contain.

Successivamente il 28 febbraio 2006 mettevamo in luce la linea di “patriottismo economico” in Francia, che aveva suscitato sia interesse, sia riprovazione da parte di vari ambienti europei.
Dai “settori strategici”, in particolare l’energia, è partita ormai da qualche anno l’inversione di tendenza rispetto all’ondata liberalizzatrice e “pro-deregulation” che aveva dominato la fine degli anni ottanta e gli anni novanta. Tale nuova tendenza viene ora dibattuta molto in Italia, un po’ tardi rispetto al suo manifestarsi.

Rischi in ascesa: Recessione in USA, Instabilità nei Balcani

17/4/2008

The World Next Week di Oxford Analytica ha appena pubblicato un update del servizio Global Stress Point

Forward-looking Intelligence from Oxford Analytica - Global Stress Points update

The risk has increased of deep recession in the United States

* The trade deficit unexpectedly rose to 62.3 billion dollars in February, from 59.0 billion dollars in January, which means that the economic boost the falling dollar has provided, in the form of higher exports, may be limited. Coupled with the rising federal budget shortfall, which will decrease room for further fiscal stimulus, this suggests that growth will be even weaker than expected this year
* However, the consumer price index rose just 0.3% month-on-month in March, which suggests that the threat of ’stagflation’ is receding. This should give the Fed leeway for further aggressive rate cuts.

Other rising risks

* Return to protectionism
* Return to serious disruption in the Balkans

Putin in Libia…

16/4/2008

Intervista per RFERL sulla visita di Putin in Libia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is traveling to Tripoli to hold talks with Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, a visit in which he hopes to secure key energy and arms deals.
[…] Russian media reports that, in addition to energy, Putin and Qaddafi are expected to discuss arms sales. Interfax quotes defense-industry sources as saying that Putin will try to close a $2.5 billion arms deal including antiaircraft systems, fighter jets, helicopters, submarines, and warships.

Some analysts say the arms deal could be linked to energy concessions and toward clearing Libya’s $3.5 billion Soviet-era debt. In 2006, Putin cut an arms-for-debt swap with Algeria, in which Russia also gained key energy concessions.

Italia: maggioranza chiara, sfide temibili

15/4/2008

Contrariamente a molte percezioni delle ultime settimane di campagna elettorale, in Parlamento siederà una maggioranza sufficientemente ampia per garantire stabilità.
Le principali sfide politiche italiane sul breve-medio termine:
1. Il rapporto interno alla coalizione vincintrice di centrodestra, anche alla luce del grande successo leghista;
2. La capacità del PD di rafforzarsi e di proseguire sulla strada tracciata;
3. La capacità dei due poli di dialogare efficacemente sulle riforme istituzionali, proseguendo nella semplificazione del sistema, in attesa del referendum del 2009;
4. La necessità di far fronte al rallentamento dell’economia nell’area euro-atlantica

Più in generale, l’Italia deve trovare una linea politica in grado di garantirne crescita, stabilità, prosperità e sicurezza in un mutato quadro geopolitico e demografico euro-mediterraneo (analisi del 13.6.2005):

Geopolitical and Demographic Aspects of the Italian Crisis

Since 1989, Italy’s political and economic discourse has been dominated by issues that are both geopolitical and economic in nature. European political and economic integration has been the dominating theme and the official goal of all governments since then. At the same time, relentless rhetoric about the importance of knowledge, technology innovation, and education as the real “capital” of the 21st century has been divulged by almost all politicians and decision makers. After 15 years, however, it appears that Italy’s integration into the E.U. is not bringing the desired effects citizens were told it would, and it must be pointed out how almost nothing has been done to put into practice the good words on education, research and technology.

In fact, Italy is increasingly dependent upon the U.S. for its security and foreign policy, and upon the E.U. for its economic policy. It’s easy to show how European integration and the E.U.’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (C.F.S.P.) — which have progressed in the last 15 years — have not led Rome to a clear reassessment of its foreign policy in the direction of a European solidarity advocated by Paris and Berlin. During the 2003 Iraq crisis, Italy did not follow the Franco-German combine’s diplomatic strategy and, instead, joined the U.S.-U.K. line, together with Poland and other European states. Before that, Rome had already upset Paris by refusing to buy Airbus’ A-400M military transport aircraft and by planning to buy the Joint Strike Fighter, a multi-role U.S. fighter aircraft in direct competition with European projects.

From a geoeconomic point of view, Italy’s struggle to be accepted into the Euro-zone has caused the country’s economic policy — already confronted by an enormous public debt — to be almost completely directed toward this goal. As a result, in order to submit to an E.U. demanding the Growth and Stability Pact’s rules, Rome has lost the capability to bring on any ambitious public spending policy.

These two geopolitical underlying facts — the persistence of a U.S.-centric foreign policy and the rise of the European Union — concurred in hampering the emergence of policies suited to safeguard Italy’s prosperity, security and competitiveness. At the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Italian Education Minister Letizia Moratti significantly responded to university researchers, who were protesting because of the lack of funding and jobs, explaining that Italy’s commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan demanded economic sacrifices and, therefore, a change in the destination of economic resources was needed. However, the link between Italian military involvement in U.S.-led operations and the orientation of public spending tends to be underestimated by many observers. Similarly, the government’s programs for public works and infrastructures frequently clash against the E.U. Growth and Stability Pact’s strict rules concerning deficit limits.

Italian classical geopolitical interests — i.e. stability and security of the Euro-Mediterranean area and advantageous economic exchange with southeastern Europe and North African countries — seem to be subordinated to the U.S.’ “Greater Middle East” project and to the Franco-German political and economic leadership in the E.U. Italy’s integration into this latter has called for a set of demanding fiscal and financial policies, but a large part of the population observe that it hasn’t successfully protected its national interests against the rise of foreign competitors, China in particular. Some exponents of Berlusconi’s government have therefore called for the introduction of a customs duty by the E.U., a move which looks extremely complicated, both for its implications and because the European Union has been built upon free market principles.

At the same time, another fact is playing a decisive part in Italy’s depression: the demographic decline. No international power has ever succeeded in enhancing its interests and its viability as an influential geopolitical actor when caught in a serious demographic crisis. Italy is nowadays the E.U. country with the highest percentage of elderly, and its population is increasingly growing older. In the period of 1981-2001, the Italian population grew a tiny .8 percent. In the same years, the ratio of elderly among the citizens doubled. Subsequent troubles for the labor market and pensions are all too obvious. However, analysts often underestimate the consequences of the combination between political weakness and instability — a long-term Italian problem — and the demographic decline. The result is the inner rigidity of a system incapable of successfully renewing its decision makers and progressively more inclined to nepotism and corrupted methods of cooptation, making meritocracy and dynamism irrelevant rhetorical exercises.

A vicious circle is now at play: the demographic decline fosters the lack of change, thus worsening the country’s delay in innovation, research and job creation; these latter consequences urge the most talented minds to go abroad in search of well-paid jobs and prestige, plus a large part of the youth finds it hard to get married and have children. This fact makes the demographic decline clearly more acute.

Italia: elezioni non decisive?

10/4/2008

L’Italia si appresta a votare. Il pericolo è una paralisi istituzionale che complichi ulteriormente il già difficile governo politico, economico e sociale del Paese.
E’ probabile che nei prossimi 12-18 mesi quel che accadrà all’interno del PD e del PDL sarà più importante ancora di quale dei due partiti prevarrà nelle elezioni del 13-14 aprile.

Lo scenario politico che emergerà dalle prossime elezioni in Italia è contraddistinto dall’incertezza. Solo con una netta e chiara vittoria del PdL anche al Senato, prospettiva per il momento non concreta, potrà portare ad un Governo stabile. Tuttavia la compagine del centrodestra è eterogeneo comprendendo la Lega, movimento autonomista del nord, ed Allenza Nazionale, partito di destra con forti connotazioni nazionalistiche e radicato al sud. Il PD, che aspira a vincere le elezioni al Senato per costringere Berlusconi alla modifica della legge elettorale, ha in seno gli stessi problemi raccogliendo tra le proprie fila i Radicali (anti preibizionisti, garantisti e contro l’ingerenza della Chiesa nello Stato) ed il partito legalista di Di Pietro nonché ampie frange di Cattolici anti-abortisti e contro le unioni civili tra individui dello stesso sesso. La scelta dei candidati all’interno delle liste, inoltre, a causa dell’impossibilità per l’elettore di apporre alcuna preferenza all’interno del partito preferito, sono state composte da un basso numero di personalità della società civile lasciando ampio spazio agli apparati di partito.

Ucraina, Georgia: ancora divisioni

3/4/2008

Come anticipato il 7 marzo, vi sono importanti divisioni all’interno della NATO riguardo l’integrazione di Ucraina e Georgia. Stamane, al vertice di Bucarest, emergono ancora tali fratture. In particolare, la diplomazia tedesca non sembra mutare posizione.

“Germany’s position didn’t change,” the diplomat said after leaders of the 26-nation alliance discussed enlargement of Western defense organization at a summit dinner in Bucharest.

Chancellor Angela Merkel had said before the meeting that Berlin thought it was too soon to offer a Membership Action Plan to either country. Russia had fiercely opposed what it sees as a NATO encroachment into its historic sphere of influence.

Diversamente, Albania e Croazia sono state invitate a unirsi all’Alleanza, come da tempo previsto.
Al di là del dialogo strategico-diplomatico USA-Russia, su NATO, BMD e altro, quel che emerge è ancora una volta che le differenti percezioni geopolitiche fra membri UE (e NATO) sono decisive nei rapporti fra mondo euro-atlantico e Russia e per la politica europea in generale.