Federico Bordonaro

Molti osservatori sono convinti che un bombardamento strategico americano dei siti nucleari iraniani e delle principali basi militari di Teheran sia “impensabile”. Ciò per varie ragioni: impopolarità della politica “unilateralista” dell’Amministrazione Bush, “iperestensione” militare USA in Iraq e Afghanistan, scarsa affidabilità dell’intelligence militare sugli obiettivi da colpire, ecc.

Non tutti, nondimeno, sono convinti che tali disincentivi siano sufficienti per fermare Washington dai propri propositi militari anti-iraniani. Ne dà conto Arnaud de Borchgrave, analista di United Press International, in un rapporto del 2 ottobre. De Borchgrave cita un colonnello USA, Sam Gardiner:

President Bush and his national security council believe seven “key truths” that eliminate all but the military option, according to Gardiner, who adds his own comments.

1. Iran is developing WMD — “that is most likely true.”

2. Iran is ignoring the international community — “true.”

3. Iran supports Hezbollah and terrorism — “true.”

4. Iran is increasingly inserting itself in Iraq and beginning to get involved in Afghanistan — “true.”

5. The people of Iran want a regime change — “most likely an exaggeration.”

6. Sanctions are not going to work — “most likely true.”

7. You cannot negotiate with these people — “not proven.”

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Alcune fonti ritengono che la guerra USA-Iran sia già iniziata, sebbene a bassa intensità. Washington starebbe effettuando operazioni coperte in territorio iraniano, e lavorando per fomentare le minoranze arabe, curde, e del Belucistan contro il governo centrale [su questo, si veda l’Intelligence Brief scritta per il P.I.N.R. il 7 luglio 2005].

Riporta de Borchgrave:

Gardiner says when Bush “Iraqs” Iran, air strikes will not be limited to the country’s widely scattered nuclear facilities, but will also include military air bases (some of them only 15 minutes flying time from Baghdad); air defense command and control; terrorist training camps; chemical facilities; medium-range ballistic missiles; Gulf-threatening assets; submarines; anti-ship missiles; and naval ships, including small, fast minelayers. He reckons “an attack of relatively high certainty on nuclear targets would require 400 aim points … 75 of these would require penetrating weapons.” Air target planners believe this can be done after five nights of bombing.

Vice President Dick Cheney is convinced “if there is even a 1 percent chance of a country passing WMD to a terrorist, the U.S. must act,” Gardiner writes, which means, “The Bush administration finds itself obliged to reject non-military options.” Israeli pressure on Bush to act before he leaves the White House is also part of the equation, he argues. But the president has a larger agenda than simply retarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Se ne deduce, se Gardiner ha ragione, che gli elementi principali sono due: evitare la produzione di armi nucleari da parte iraniana e assecondare i timori israeliani; ma un nuovo elemento viene introdotto — l’agenda del presidente USA è più ampia :

“The case against (Iran’s) regime is so forceful, and so multifaceted,” Gardiner points out, “that it becomes clear the goal is not simply to do away with the regime’s enrichment program … but to do away with the regime itself.”

President George W. Bush, writes Gardiner, sees himself like Winston Churchill standing against the appeasers, and “believes the world will only appreciate him after he leaves office, talks about the Middle East in messianic terms, and is said to have told those close to him that he has got to attack Iran because even if a Republican succeeds him … he will not have the same freedom of action that Bush enjoys.”

Il messianismo americano è l’elemento spesso mancante (perché non visto dagli osservatori) nell’equazione. Ma è un elemento importante, ci dice Gardiner.

E De Borchgrave conclude ricordando che l’Amministrazione Bush non dovrà preoccuparsi in fondo più di tanto per l’impatto mediatico di un’eventuale azione militare. E spiega perché:

Unlike the six months of preparations for Operation Desert Field and the deployments that preceded Iraqi Freedom, the Iran buildup will “not be a major CNN event.” They will take place below the media’s radar screen, such as moving Air Force tankers to staging bases and the movement of additional Navy assets to the region. “We can expect the number of administration references to Iran to significantly increase,” Gardiner wrote, with four principal themes — Iran’s nuclear program, terrorism, the threat to Israel’s existence, and the Iran-al Qaida link.

Congressional approval? When Democratic Congressmen offered an amendment to the Defense bill in June that would have required the president to get authorization before taking military action, the amendment failed. A strike on Iran, as seen by the White House, has already been authorized. It’s part of the global war on terrorism. So the strike on Iran could be ordered any time in the next two years.