Federico Bordonaro

Analisi scritta insieme a Jean-Philippe Miginiac per il P.I.N.R. In evidenza il rafforzamento politico di Hezbollah, nonostante la devastante offensiva miliatare israeliana non sia stata così inefficace come molti pensano:

As a result of the July-August conflict, Hezbollah is winning the information war within the Arab world even though it suffered losses in the 32 days of the war. Israel decided to advance cautiously and slowly on the ground after the air campaign because it was concerned with the high number of casualties caused by Hezbollah’s fierce resistance.

According to Israel, it destroyed much of Hezbollah’s longer-range Zelzal missiles, killed approximately 500 guerrillas, disrupted the militia’s supply routes and eliminated some top officers. Nevertheless, Israel failed to annihilate the organization’s offensive capability (which was the war’s declared objective).

[…]

It can be expected that Hezbollah will try to capitalize from its political success as it will try to progressively take control of the leadership in Lebanon. Beirut’s current administration appears weak, and the only variable that could change the balance of power between Lebanon’s Siniora government and Hezbollah would be a massive influx of U.S.-E.U. military aid to Lebanon’s army, which could easily spark a very dangerous conflict between the latter and Hezbollah.

On the other hand, if France and the other components of the U.N. forces refrain from decisively upgrading Beirut’s military capabilities, the effective disarmament of Hezbollah seems impossible to attain, thus putting the resolution and U.N. credibility at risk.

With Hezbollah and its leader rapidly emerging as a dominant force in Lebanon, expect Israel and the United States to consider all available options to destroy what they perceive as an unacceptable threat. Because of Tehran’s deep involvement in Lebanon via Hezbollah, the stage is set for a new phase in the U.S.-Iranian conflict.

Seymour Hersh, celebre giornalista americano, riferisce sul New Yorker il 14 agosto della posizione statunitense riguardo l’azione militare israeliana contro Hezbollah: doveva essere una prova generale per i bombardamenti delle installazioni nucleari e dei bunker iraniani da parte degli USA.

According to a Middle East expert with knowledge of the current thinking of both the Israeli and the U.S. governments, Israel had devised a plan for attacking Hezbollah—and shared it with Bush Administration officials—well before the July 12th kidnappings. “It’s not that the Israelis had a trap that Hezbollah walked into,” he said, “but there was a strong feeling in the White House that sooner or later the Israelis were going to do it.”

The Middle East expert said that the Administration had several reasons for supporting the Israeli bombing campaign. Within the State Department, it was seen as a way to strengthen the Lebanese government so that it could assert its authority over the south of the country, much of which is controlled by Hezbollah. He went on, “The White House was more focussed on stripping Hezbollah of its missiles, because, if there was to be a military option against Iran’s nuclear facilities, it had to get rid of the weapons that Hezbollah could use in a potential retaliation at Israel. Bush wanted both. Bush was going after Iran, as part of the Axis of Evil, and its nuclear sites, and he was interested in going after Hezbollah as part of his interest in democratization, with Lebanon as one of the crown jewels of Middle East democracy.”

Administration officials denied that they knew of Israel’s plan for the air war. The White House did not respond to a detailed list of questions. In response to a separate request, a National Security Council spokesman said, “Prior to Hezbollah’s attack on Israel, the Israeli government gave no official in Washington any reason to believe that Israel was planning to attack. Even after the July 12th attack, we did not know what the Israeli plans were.” A Pentagon spokesman said, “The United States government remains committed to a diplomatic solution to the problem of Iran’s clandestine nuclear weapons program,” and denied the story, as did a State Department spokesman.

The United States and Israel have shared intelligence and enjoyed close military coöperation for decades, but early this spring, according to a former senior intelligence official, high-level planners from the U.S. Air Force—under pressure from the White House to develop a war plan for a decisive strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities—began consulting with their counterparts in the Israeli Air Force.

“The big question for our Air Force was how to hit a series of hard targets in Iran successfully,” the former senior intelligence official said. “Who is the closest ally of the U.S. Air Force in its planning? It’s not Congo—it’s Israel. Everybody knows that Iranian engineers have been advising Hezbollah on tunnels and underground gun emplacements. And so the Air Force went to the Israelis with some new tactics and said to them, ‘Let’s concentrate on the bombing and share what we have on Iran and what you have on Lebanon.’ ” The discussions reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, he said.

“The Israelis told us it would be a cheap war with many benefits,” a U.S. government consultant with close ties to Israel said. “Why oppose it? We’ll be able to hunt down and bomb missiles, tunnels, and bunkers from the air. It would be a demo for Iran.”