Federico Bordonaro

Tra la fine degli anni novanta e l’inizio del secolo, Mosca appariva in difficoltà su tutte le scacchiere geopolitiche: Balcani, Europa orientale, Caucaso, Asia centrale. Ma aveva in mano due carte decisive: l’energia e la tecnologia militare. L’uso sapiente — ancorché brutale — di tali carte ha permesso a Putin di riguadagnare rapidamente terreno nei confronti degli Stati Uniti, e di emergere come una potenza imprescindibile nei nuovi scenari internazionali.

Per quanto riguarda la strategia energetica di Mosca, segnalo due eccellenti articoli apparsi oggi su Asia Times Online. Il primo è di W. Joseph Stroupe:

A circle defining international energy security is now being drawn. The artist is Russia, which is steadily pulling into this circle all the resource-rich corporate states around the globe. These countries have a profound political affinity for one another and a simultaneous collective disdain, and even a hatred, for US-led unipolar dominance. The multinational oil companies of the West are being marginalized as a direct result.

Il secondo è di M K Bhadrakumar:

ccording to Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, by November, the customs union will have taken place comprising Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, while the other EEC members may join in the next 18-month period or so. It is a dramatic gain for Russia to have reached such a high level of integration with Kazakhstan. The Moscow-Astana axis potentially forms a formidable core within the post-Soviet space. Russia has in effect rebuffed the US strategy of making inroads into its ties with Kazakhstan.

Astana has been a frequent destination for US dignitaries in the recent months, including Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Energy Secretary Sam Boden. A visit by Nazarbayev to the US is in the cards. Of late, US officials have openly singled out Kazakhstan for flattering, fulsome praise in the hope of playing on Astana’s perceived vanities as a geopolitical fulcrum.

Furthermore, Russia has hit back at the US for the latter’s delaying tactic apropos its membership in the World Trade Organization by getting the Sochi summit to agree that the integration within the EEC and the accession of its members to the WTO should be harmonized until the establishment of the customs union. In real terms, Russia is counting on the customs union being assigned the role of an alternative to the WTO.

Analisi scritta insieme a Jean-Philippe Miginiac per il P.I.N.R. In evidenza il rafforzamento politico di Hezbollah, nonostante la devastante offensiva miliatare israeliana non sia stata così inefficace come molti pensano:

As a result of the July-August conflict, Hezbollah is winning the information war within the Arab world even though it suffered losses in the 32 days of the war. Israel decided to advance cautiously and slowly on the ground after the air campaign because it was concerned with the high number of casualties caused by Hezbollah’s fierce resistance.

According to Israel, it destroyed much of Hezbollah’s longer-range Zelzal missiles, killed approximately 500 guerrillas, disrupted the militia’s supply routes and eliminated some top officers. Nevertheless, Israel failed to annihilate the organization’s offensive capability (which was the war’s declared objective).

[…]

It can be expected that Hezbollah will try to capitalize from its political success as it will try to progressively take control of the leadership in Lebanon. Beirut’s current administration appears weak, and the only variable that could change the balance of power between Lebanon’s Siniora government and Hezbollah would be a massive influx of U.S.-E.U. military aid to Lebanon’s army, which could easily spark a very dangerous conflict between the latter and Hezbollah.

On the other hand, if France and the other components of the U.N. forces refrain from decisively upgrading Beirut’s military capabilities, the effective disarmament of Hezbollah seems impossible to attain, thus putting the resolution and U.N. credibility at risk.

With Hezbollah and its leader rapidly emerging as a dominant force in Lebanon, expect Israel and the United States to consider all available options to destroy what they perceive as an unacceptable threat. Because of Tehran’s deep involvement in Lebanon via Hezbollah, the stage is set for a new phase in the U.S.-Iranian conflict.

Seymour Hersh, celebre giornalista americano, riferisce sul New Yorker il 14 agosto della posizione statunitense riguardo l’azione militare israeliana contro Hezbollah: doveva essere una prova generale per i bombardamenti delle installazioni nucleari e dei bunker iraniani da parte degli USA.

According to a Middle East expert with knowledge of the current thinking of both the Israeli and the U.S. governments, Israel had devised a plan for attacking Hezbollah—and shared it with Bush Administration officials—well before the July 12th kidnappings. “It’s not that the Israelis had a trap that Hezbollah walked into,” he said, “but there was a strong feeling in the White House that sooner or later the Israelis were going to do it.”

The Middle East expert said that the Administration had several reasons for supporting the Israeli bombing campaign. Within the State Department, it was seen as a way to strengthen the Lebanese government so that it could assert its authority over the south of the country, much of which is controlled by Hezbollah. He went on, “The White House was more focussed on stripping Hezbollah of its missiles, because, if there was to be a military option against Iran’s nuclear facilities, it had to get rid of the weapons that Hezbollah could use in a potential retaliation at Israel. Bush wanted both. Bush was going after Iran, as part of the Axis of Evil, and its nuclear sites, and he was interested in going after Hezbollah as part of his interest in democratization, with Lebanon as one of the crown jewels of Middle East democracy.”

Administration officials denied that they knew of Israel’s plan for the air war. The White House did not respond to a detailed list of questions. In response to a separate request, a National Security Council spokesman said, “Prior to Hezbollah’s attack on Israel, the Israeli government gave no official in Washington any reason to believe that Israel was planning to attack. Even after the July 12th attack, we did not know what the Israeli plans were.” A Pentagon spokesman said, “The United States government remains committed to a diplomatic solution to the problem of Iran’s clandestine nuclear weapons program,” and denied the story, as did a State Department spokesman.

The United States and Israel have shared intelligence and enjoyed close military coöperation for decades, but early this spring, according to a former senior intelligence official, high-level planners from the U.S. Air Force—under pressure from the White House to develop a war plan for a decisive strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities—began consulting with their counterparts in the Israeli Air Force.

“The big question for our Air Force was how to hit a series of hard targets in Iran successfully,” the former senior intelligence official said. “Who is the closest ally of the U.S. Air Force in its planning? It’s not Congo—it’s Israel. Everybody knows that Iranian engineers have been advising Hezbollah on tunnels and underground gun emplacements. And so the Air Force went to the Israelis with some new tactics and said to them, ‘Let’s concentrate on the bombing and share what we have on Iran and what you have on Lebanon.’ ” The discussions reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, he said.

“The Israelis told us it would be a cheap war with many benefits,” a U.S. government consultant with close ties to Israel said. “Why oppose it? We’ll be able to hunt down and bomb missiles, tunnels, and bunkers from the air. It would be a demo for Iran.”

Secondo gli analisti del Jane’s Information Group, la Siria è sempre più vista, anche dai decisori israeliani, come “parte della soluzione” e non solo — o non più — del problema.

L’intelligence digest dell’11 agosto riporta:

Among the leading proponents of this theory is former Mossad Deputy Chief David Kimche, now a commentator on regional security. He suggests that the current crisis could actually offer an opportunity for achieving peace. He said: “The joker in the Middle Eastern pack of cards is Syria - negative, autocratic, dictatorial Syria, ally of Iran, supporter of Hizbullah, seemingly the last country in the world to deal with, except perhaps through the barrel of a gun.”

La questione, mentre il cessate-il-fuoco si avvicina, è adesso: fin quando Iran e Siria potranno restare esclusi dalla partita politico-diplomatica per un nuovo equilibrio mediorientale?

Neda Bolourchi, su Asia Times Online dell’8 agosto, spiega come il ruolo di Teheran nella guerra tra Israele ed Hezbollah stia mutando a mano a mano che il conflitto si protrae.
Nei primi giorni, l’Iran era percepito soprattutto come un attore destabilizzante, e fra in principali responsabili della grave crisi. Adesso, dopo un mese di scontri, la gran parte degli osservatori lo indica come “parte della soluzione”, e non solo del problema.

In altre parole, afferma Bolourchi, l’Iran deve essere coinvolto. Anche perché

[…] Iran will likely be a winner in the long term on three points. First, Iran has gained politically in the broad Muslim world as the only country standing by the Muslim and Arab cause in the face of Israeli aggression. Regardless of what the regimes of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan say, the Arab street has and does support Iran’s populist policies. By attacking Hezbollah, Hamas or Iran, “America’s Arab allies” are merely seen as puppets of US hegemony in the Middle East. Such an issue is more and more relevant in the context of today’s digital world politics.

Second, as Iran is one of very few parties that have contact with Hezbollah, the crisis conveys that Tehran can be a restraining and pragmatic power. Thus the international attention given to the Islamic Republic during the crisis demonstrates that Iran is a large power to be reckoned with and not discounted regarding regional power politics. As a result, the Lebanese crisis displays the centrality of Iran in the future political arrangements of the region.

Third, Hezbollah by virtue of its political victory will play an even more political role in Lebanon. In turn, Iran gains more leverage and influence in the regional context. In gaining more influence in Lebanon, the Islamic Republic reinforces its centrality in the Middle East’s political agreements.

Dopo una sessione a porte chiuse nella notte tra il 31 luglio e il 1 agosto, il cabinetto di sicurezza israeliano ha approvato l’estensione delle operazioni di terra nel Sud del Libano.

Si sta verificando quanto anticipato nella Intelligence Brief scritta per il P.I.N.R. lo scorso 21 luglio:

“expect Israel to steadily pursue the goal of the complete destruction of Hezbollah’s arsenal and to launch a rapid invasion of southern Lebanon in order to quickly eliminate Hezbollah’s presence in the region.” […]

“Look for the United States to maintain its near total support for Olmert since Washington seeks to weaken Syria’s and Iran’s influence in the region and is obviously keen on annihilating Hezbollah’s offensive capabilities.”

“[…] Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s political influence in Lebanon and even among the Palestinians may increase at the end of the current conflagration.”

Sull’appoggio crescente per Hezbollah da parte di paesi arabi inizialmente favorevoli al suo disarmo, si veda in particolare:
Jim Lobe su Asia Times e Neil MacFarquhar sul New York Times.