Federico Bordonaro

Doppia analisi del conflitto in corso sul P.I.N.R. Dario Cristiani prende in esame gli obiettivi e il ruolo degli attori regionali (Siria e Iran):

the crisis between Israel and Lebanon is not merely a conflict between two states, but is a more complicated question involving state actors — Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Iran — and non-state actors — Hezbollah, Hamas and other Palestinian militant factions. It is in Iran’s and Syria’s interests to support these armed groups — especially Hezbollah — but if Israel threatens to expand the war into the larger region, this support could weaken.

Una Intelligence Brief fa invece il punto sugli aspetti strategico-militari alla luce delle potenzialità offensive degli Hezbollah e degli obiettivi dichiarati dal governo Olmert, cercando di individuare le probabili prossime mosse israeliane.

Such an arsenal gave Hezbollah the capability to strike all major Israeli cities such as Haifa, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, thus threatening Israel’s core. After Hezbollah’s retaliatory strength became clear, the Israeli military began to perceive the threat differently, with military analysts saying that some of Israel’s worst fears were coming true. Therefore, the Olmert administration considered its vital interests at stake and decided that a decisive victory against Hezbollah needed to be achieved at all costs.

Such a decisive victory, however, may be more complicated to achieve than it appears. Although the Israelis can overcome tactical difficulties such as the tracing of all launch infrastructure deployed by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, they cannot rely solely on air strikes since they are trying to eliminate Hezbollah from southern Lebanon permanently.

Nel pomeriggio del 21 luglio, il sito di analisi geopolitica Strategic Forecasting così commentava il contesto strategico : […leggi: ]

Hezbollah’s strategy appears to be threefold. First, force Israel into costly attacks against prepared fortifications. Second, draw Israeli troops as deeply into Lebanon as possible, forcing them to fight on extended supply lines. Third, move into an Iraqi-style insurgency from which Israel — out of fear of a resumption of rocket attacks — cannot withdraw, but which the Israelis also cannot endure because of extended long-term casualties. This appears to have been a carefully planned strategy, built around a threat to Israeli cities that Israel can’t afford. The war has begun at Hezbollah’s time and choosing.

Israel is caught between three strategic imperatives. First, it must end the threat to Israeli cities, which must involve the destruction of Hezbollah’s launch capabilities south of the Litani River. Second, it must try to destroy Hezbollah’s infrastructure, which means it must move into the Bekaa Valley and as far as the southern suburbs of Beirut. Third, it must do so in such a way that it is not dragged into a long-term, unsustainable occupation against a capable insurgency.

Hezbollah has implemented its strategy by turning southern Lebanon into a military stronghold, consisting of well-designed bunkers that serve both as fire bases and launch facilities for rockets. The militants appear to be armed with anti-tank weapons and probably anti-aircraft weapons, some of which appear to be of American origin, raising the question of how they were acquired. Hezbollah wants to draw Israel into protracted fighting in this area in order to inflict maximum casualties and to change the psychological equation for both military and political reasons.