Analisi scritta per Asia Times Online sul vertice romano del 26 luglio:
Predictably, talks in Rome on the Middle East crisis failed. Behind diplomacy’s words and vows of enhanced international cooperation, regional and external powers are steadily pursuing their interests. And on these interests, no one, from Hezbollah to the US, is yet ready to compromise.
La stampa internazionale sembra più interessata alla questione della proliferazione nucleare che a quella della proliferazione missilistica e al problema dei sistemi anti-missilistici.
E tuttavia, come già durante la Guerra fredda, i missili balistici rivestono una grande importanza nei rapporti politico-strategici mondiali. Un articolo per il P.I.N.R., scritto con Giuseppe Anzera, cerca di sintetizzare la problematica, soprattutto dal punto di vista delle percezioni europee e statunitensi.
At present, the end of the Cold War framework is inducing some important changes. The two fundamental ones are the renewed efforts by states like Iran and North Korea, considered by Washington as threats to U.S. interests, to enhance their offensive capabilities, and the E.U.-U.S. difficult strategic debate over the issue.
Doppia analisi del conflitto in corso sul P.I.N.R. Dario Cristiani prende in esame gli obiettivi e il ruolo degli attori regionali (Siria e Iran):
the crisis between Israel and Lebanon is not merely a conflict between two states, but is a more complicated question involving state actors — Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Iran — and non-state actors — Hezbollah, Hamas and other Palestinian militant factions. It is in Iran’s and Syria’s interests to support these armed groups — especially Hezbollah — but if Israel threatens to expand the war into the larger region, this support could weaken.
Una Intelligence Brief fa invece il punto sugli aspetti strategico-militari alla luce delle potenzialità offensive degli Hezbollah e degli obiettivi dichiarati dal governo Olmert, cercando di individuare le probabili prossime mosse israeliane.
Such an arsenal gave Hezbollah the capability to strike all major Israeli cities such as Haifa, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, thus threatening Israel’s core. After Hezbollah’s retaliatory strength became clear, the Israeli military began to perceive the threat differently, with military analysts saying that some of Israel’s worst fears were coming true. Therefore, the Olmert administration considered its vital interests at stake and decided that a decisive victory against Hezbollah needed to be achieved at all costs.
Such a decisive victory, however, may be more complicated to achieve than it appears. Although the Israelis can overcome tactical difficulties such as the tracing of all launch infrastructure deployed by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, they cannot rely solely on air strikes since they are trying to eliminate Hezbollah from southern Lebanon permanently.
Nel pomeriggio del 21 luglio, il sito di analisi geopolitica Strategic Forecasting così commentava il contesto strategico : […leggi: (more…)
Victoria Samson, analista del Center for Defense Information, ci offre un’interessante analisi delle difese anti-missile israeliane sulla base della prima settimana di conflitto tra le forze armate israeliane e Hezbollah.
Despite being inundated with volleys from Hezbollah – at writing, estimates range from 700 to 1,500 missiles and rockets launched at Israel in the past week – Israel’s two missile defense systems have been silent. Neither its Arrow system (co-developed with the United States) nor its version of the Patriot has been used in this conflict, largely because they are not designed to handle the kind of threat that Hezbollah represents. Hezbollah is shooting projectiles that have ranges mostly around 10 miles, while the missile defense systems are geared toward shooting down missiles that range from a couple hundred to roughly 1,000 miles.
[…] despite Israel’s two-tiered missile defense system, it is missing the capability to defend against short-range missiles. According to Uzi Rubin, the founder of the Arrow, it is not optimized for threats with ranges below 125 miles or so. In May, the Israeli government awarded a contract to a Raytheon/Rafael team to provide a defense against missiles with ranges of 24 to 155 miles. This new short-range ballistic missile defense system, which would use a direct intercept to destroy its targets, is supposed to also defend against cruise missiles. However, it is still in the very early planning stages, with its development continuing through 2010. In the meantime, Israel can defend itself the old-fashioned way: through conventional attacks on ground targets thought to be associated with Hezbollah or diplomatic forays.
Un mio articolo per ISN-Security Watch cerca di fare un bilancio delle conseguenze del doppio “no” francese e olandese al Trattato costituzionale, un anno dopo i referenda.
[…] one year after the political earthquake that rocked the EU, the bloc’s political parties and observers are committed to identifying major trends - a commitment that has led to the discovery that, notwithstanding the hard blow thrown by the French and Dutch vote, the somewhat catastrophic predictions of many pundits made in the immediate aftermath of the Constitutional Treaty’s rejection turned out to be incorrect.
Certainly, the most ambitious plans for the EU have probably been the real victims of the failed referenda. The French-backed Europe puissance (the goal of building a European political and strategic superpower) or the British-sponsored liberal and pro-deregulation agenda failed to gather any real momentum. However, EU leaders are optimistic on rapidly achieving more pragmatic and realistic policies on more specific issues. And in this respect, Europe’s pre-2005 characteristics have not changed so much.
Sul risultato dei referenda del 2005, la deputata britannica Gisela Stuart si è espressa in modo incisivo [leggi tutto: (more…)
Alcuni esponenti social-democratici del governo tedesco di coalizione hanno duramente attaccato i progetti di Angela Merkel in materia di riforma del sistema sanitario. Come era prevedibile, la popolarità di Merkel è stata rapidamente intaccata dai propositi di riduzione del Welfare State; tuttavia, anche il mondo imprenditoriale tedesco è contrario all’impostazione della proposta targata CDU.
Un’intelligence brief scritta per il PINR cerca di spiegare gli effetti sulla politica europea di un indebolimento del governo tedesco:
With Germany concentrated on domestic problems, it is almost certain that Europe as a whole will not undertake any ambitious reform battles. After the shock of the 2005 French and Dutch rejection of the proposed E.U. Constitutional Treaty, the Union was unable to decide whether it wants to re-propose the same draft at a later date or if it will instead significantly modify it. Germany, together with Spain and Italy, lean toward the first option. Yet France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Poland are determined to introduce changes to the text.
The result of such divergent views is that E.U. political decision makers decided to prolong the period of “reflection” over the constitutional issue until 2008-2009. The fact that France and the Netherlands hold crucial elections in 2007, and Germany and Britain in 2009, has contributed to this delay.
Un articolo del Washington Times di oggi fa il punto sulle conseguenze geostrategiche della mossa nordcoreana. L’articolo cita esplicitamente un’analisi del P.I.N.R. del 20 giugno.
Sugli ultimi sviluppi, e sulle prospettive a breve, si veda anche l’Intelligence Brief del P.I.N.R. del 5 luglio:
In the wake of the missile tests, it will be significant to monitor how all of the players in the Six-Party Talks adjust their positions. Washington will likely respond aggressively, although short of any actions that will cause a radical change in the intensity of the conflict; immediately after the tests, for example, the White House announced that while the tests were “provocative,” they posed “no immediate threat to the United States.” Instead, Washington has concentrated on the fact that the more threatening Taepodong-2 missile test failed. Tokyo will follow Washington’s lead since U.S.-Japan interests are generally aligned toward North Korea, and it apparently has called for an emergency Wednesday meeting at the U.N. Security Council.
More revealing will be the response by China and South Korea. If Beijing does not take significant action against Pyongyang after the tests, it will demonstrate that Beijing will maintain its current status-quo policy toward North Korea. If Seoul refrains from harshly criticizing Pyongyang, it will demonstrate that it does not see the missile tests as a significant threat to its interests and will continue to pursue its policy of increasing economic ties with the North.
