Federico Bordonaro

Jephraim Gundzik, su Asia Times Online di oggi, mette in luce con la consueta lucidità le connessioni tra crisi politica, implicazioni diplomatico-strategiche e affari economici in merito allo sforzo statunitense per impedire all’Iran di realizzare il suo presunto programma militare-nucleare.

These sanctions include freezing the foreign assets of Iranian officials, closing export credit lines, closing Iranian government bank accounts, and freezing Iranian government assets. None of these financial sanctions target Iran’s physical oil exports, however. Technically, Iran would still be allowed to export its oil to France, Britain, Germany and Japan. The only problem is that Iran would be loath to export oil to customers in countries where its assets are frozen, because revenue from oil sales could be frozen too.

Whether economic sanctions against Tehran are imposed within or outside the UN, such sanctions would inevitably lead to a reduction in Iran’s oil exports. The only question is how sharply oil exports would be cut. In addition to France, Britain Germany and Japan, China also imports a significant amount of oil from Iran. With vast energy-related investments and investment contracts in Iran, China is very unlikely to apply any sanctions on Tehran. On the contrary, China may seize the opportunity delivered by surplus Iranian oil to cement much larger long-term oil-import contracts with Iran.